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ABORTION: INFORMED CONSENT FOR THE MENTALLY INCOMPETENT 
Amy K. Naegele 
INTRODUCfION 
A great deal of attention is focused on the question of abortion in today's 
society. Courts, legislatures and the media are constantly dealing with the issue of 
abortion rights. Most of the questions focus on whether a woman has the right to 
obtain an abortion in a given situation. Little attention is given to the right to not have 
an abortion; it is generally considered absolute. The question often arises, however, in 
the case of an incompetent woman. When it does, those dealing with it will discover 
that there is little existing law on which they can rely. Consider, for example, the 
following scenario: 
Ann Smith is a twenty-year-old, mildly mentally retarded woman. Ann 
has lived in Virginia her entire life. She has always been dependent on 
her parents. When she reached the age of eighteen, Ann's parents, Mr. 
and Mrs. Smith, petitioned the court and successfully had her adjudicated 
incompetent. The Smiths have been appointed Ann's legal guardians. 
Ann has recently become pregnant. Her obstetrician believes that she is 
approximately sixteen weeks pregnant. The Smiths feel that Ann should 
have an abortion, and they have consented to the procedure. They are 
convinced that Ann would not be able to care for a child by herself. 
Although they are willing to help raise this grandchild, they are 
concerned that, should they die before the child reaches adulthood, the 
state would take the chid from Ann, devastating her. Ann, however, does 
not want an abortion. She is very excited about the possibility of having 
a baby and believes that, with the help of her parents, she could raise the 
child. She also believes that, once she proves that she can be a good 
mother, no one will be able to take her child away. Ann's physician is 
unwilling to perform the abortion because, although the Smiths, as her 
legal guardians, have consented to it, Ann herself has repeatedly refused 
to consent. 
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What is the physician to do in this situation? Which is the proper party to 
consent to an abortion for Ann? Does the court have any power to order the 
procedure? 
This paper examines the current law in Virginia and its applicability to the 
situation presented here. It proposes a scheme which might potentially be enacted by 
the Virginia legislature, and examines it in terms of Constitutional propriety. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTNE 
In an earlier time, when less was understood about mental retardation, a decision 
regarding Ann's right to reproduce might have been influenced by the popular notion 
of eugenics. In the early twentieth century, the belief that mental illness was genetic 
was widely held. As a result, laws were passed which attempted to prevent procreation 
by the mentally ill or incompetent. I 
Virginia law authorized involuntary sterilization of persons committed to state 
institutions for the mentally ill.2 The Virginia Supreme Court explained that the 
purpose of the statute was "to protect the class of socially inadequate citizens named 
therein from themselves and to promote the welfare of society by mitigating race 
degeneracy and raising the average standards for intelligence of the people of the 
State."3 In Buck v. Bell,4 the court indicated that the interest of society in being free 
from "mental defectives" outweighed the interest of Carrie Buck, an institutionalized 
I Annotation, Validity of Statutes Authorizing Asexualization or Sterilization of 
Criminals or Mental Defectives, 53 A.L.R. 3d 960 (1973). 
2 For a discussion of Virginia sterilization law in the 1920s, see Buck v. Bell, 
143 Va. 310, 130 S.E. 516 (1925). 
3 Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 318, 130 S.E. 516, 519 (1925), affd 274 U.S. 
200 (1927). 
4 143 Va. 310, 130 S.E. 516 (1925). 
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woman, in not being sterilized. The court noted that Buck was the "probable potential 
parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise affected as she is."s 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Virginia decision in Buck v. Bell.6 
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, explained the goal (and propriety) of eugenics: 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the 
best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon 
those who already sap the strength of the State for the lesser sacrifices, 
often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our 
being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if 
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let 
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are 
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.7 
Holmes' opinion reflects the view, widely held at the time, that the mentally 
retarded have no interest in nor understanding of procreation. Thus, the Court gave its 
approval to state policy designed to promote the interest and good of society by 
subverting the rights of the mentally incompetent. 
Had Ann's situation been presented at the time, she would probably have been 
compelled to submit to the abortion. Evaluated under such a system, her right to make 
the abortion decision would probably have been ignored. The interests of society in 
preventing the birth of yet another "socially inadequate" individual would have 
outweighed her interest in having a child. 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell has never been 
officially overturned. Its validity, however, is questionable in light of current 
understanding of mental illness and retardation and recognition of rights of individuals 
- so impaired.8 
S [d. at 315, 130 S.E. at 517. 
6 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
7 [d. at 207. 
8 Modem case law has focused not only on involuntary sterilization, but also 
on the right of the incompetent to choose sterilization as a method of contraception. 
The states are varied in their approach to these problems. For an explanation of 
116 
CURRENT VIRGINIA LAW 
Consent and Abortion Law 
Virginia's current statutory scheme is ambiguous regarding the dilemma 
presented by Ann's situation. Analysis of the statutes regarding abortion, mental 
incompetence, and consent to medical treatment reveals significant gaps in coverage of 
the topic by the legislature. 
Abortion is a crime in Virginia, unless performed in strict compliance with the 
demands of the statutes.9 The requirement most significant to the analysis of Ann's 
right to decide whether to have an abortion is the requirement of informed consent. 
The statute provides that the physician must obtain the informed written consent of any 
woman seeking an abortion; if the woman is incompetent, the doctor may legally 
perform the abortion only after consent has been given in writing by the woman's 
guardian.\O Thus, the law requires two things: (1) consent by the pregnant woman, and 
(2) consent by the guardian if the woman is incompetent. The statute is silent, 
however, as to whether the consent of the guardian is required in addition to or in lieu 
of consent by the pregnant woman. 
Section 37.1-134.4 of the Virginia Code ll provides two means for surrogate 
decision-making regarding medical treatment for incompetents. The first allows persons 
in designated classes to make decisions on behalf of incompetents.12 This law 
specifically excludes abortion from its operation, although the statute states that it is 
various theories and approaches, see S.J. BRAKEL, J. PARRY, & B.A. WEINER, THE 
MENTAlLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 521-30 (1985). 
9 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71 (1988). 
10Id. 
II VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Supp. 1990) 
12Id. 
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simply an "alternative to other statutory and common law authority for making medical 
decisions on behalf of adult persons unable to make informed decisions."13 The 
surrogate decisionmaking statute is simply procedural; it does not alter the requirements 
for informed consent.14 Medical treatment of incompetents may also be authorized by 
judicial order.ls Authorization of abortion is, however, specifically excluded from the 
operation of this statute as well. 16 Although the statutorily prescribed means for 
substitute decisionmaking cannot apply to abortion, they demonstrate policy 
consideration by the Virginia legislature of the wishes of the incompetent individual. 
Prior to authorizing medical treatment, the decisionmaker is required to consider the 
incompetent's views regarding the proposed procedure, to the extent to which they can 
be ascertained. The surrogate decision making statute states that action relating to 
treatment to which the incompetent person objects shall not be taken by the provider 
of care, nor shall the surrogate authorize treatment to which he knows the incompetent 
objects.17 Similarly, in cases of judicial authorization of treatment, the court may not 
authorize a course of treatment which is shown to be contrary to the basic values or 
religious beliefs of the incompetent.18 Thus, it is apparent that while Virginia allows 
substituted decisionmaking for incompetents, its policy is to consider the feelings and 
views of the incompetent who is to be subjected to the treatment. 
The consent and abortion laws, therefore, shed little light on a solution to the 
dilemma presented by Ann's situation. The statutes require that a guardian or similarly 
situated person consent to an abortion for an incompetent woman, yet they provide no 
13 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4(A) (Supp. 1990). 
14 [d. 
IS [d. at § 37.1-134.5. 
16 [d. at § 37.1-134.5(H)(1). 
17 [d. at § 37.1-134.4(D). 
18 [d. at § 37.1-134.5(0)(4). 
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means by which the required authorization may be given. They provide mechanisms 
for consent to medical treatment for Ann, yet they specifically exclude abortion from 
the operation of these mechanisms. They do, however, leave open the option of other, 
non-statutory, means by which a substituted decision regarding medical treatment might 
be made. Additionally, the statutes illuminate Virginia policy choices reflecting a 
concern for the views of the incompetent individual. The abortion statute specifically 
requires consent of a guardian to an abortion for an incompetent, but does not specify 
whether such consent is controlling in the absence of consent by the incompetent. 
Under the existing statutory structure, perhaps the strongest argument that can 
be made is one denying the authority of Ann's parents or the court to authorize the 
abortion to which Ann will not consent. The statutes do not specifically allow for such 
substituted consent in the case of abortion, and in fact explicitly deny the applicability 
of consent statutes to the abortion laws. Furthermore, the policy reflected in the 
existing law is to respect the wishes of the incompetent individual. Ann has made her 
objection to the abortion very clear, so compulsion of the procedure would apparently 
violate this state policy. 
Sterilization Law 
In light of the ambiguity in the abortion and consent laws, an examination of 
Virginia's law regarding sterilization of incompetents may be helpful in analyzing the 
law's appropriateness as an analogy to the abortion situation. Virginia law provides a 
procedure by which performance of a sterilization operation upon an adult incapable of 
giving informed consent can be judicially authorized.19 The sterilization law provides 
clear procedural guidelines to the court in making the decision regarding sterilization. 
In addition to ftling and notification requirements,21l the court must determine that the 
19 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2976 (1988). 
211 [d. at §§ 54.1-2976(1), (2). 
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individual has been adjudicated incompetent in accordance with Virginia law and is 
unlikely to be competent in the foreseeable future to make the sterilization decision.21 
The physician must have explained to the person to be sterilized, to the best extent 
possible, the operation and its risks, as well as available alternative means of 
contraception.22 The court must elicit and consider the views of the person regarding 
the sterilization.23 If the court issues an order for sterilization, a thirty-day waiting 
period applies before the operation may be performed.2A 
The law also enumerates the requisite evidentiary fmdings, to be made through 
medical, social and psychological evaluation of the person, which must precede any 
authorization of sterilization by the court. Specifically, in order to authorize 
sterilization, the court must find that: 
1. There is a need for contraception. The court shall find that the 
person is engaging in sexual activity at the present time or is likely to 
engage in sexual activity in the near future and that pregnancy would not 
usually be intended by such person if such person were competent and 
engaging in sexual activity under similar circumstances; 
2. There is no reasonable alternative method of contraception to 
sterilization; 
3. The proposed method of sterilization conforms with standard 
medical practice, and the treatment can be carried out without 
unreasonable risk to the life and health of a person; and 
4. The nature and extent of the person's mental disability renders 
the person permanently incapable of caring for and raising a child. The 
court shall base this finding on empirical evidence and not solely on 
standardized tests.2S 
21 Id. at § 54.1-2976(4). 
22 Id. at § 54.1-2976(3). 
23 Id. at § 54.1-2976(5). 
2A Id. at § 54.1-2976(7). 
2S Id. at § 54.1-2977. 
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These procedures and required findings reflect a concern for the rights of 
mentally incompetent citizens on the part of the Virginia legislature. It is apparent that 
Virginia currently seeks to ensure that the reproductive capabilities of its citizens are 
protected and not removed unnecessarily or without due process of law. Perhaps 
similar provisions allowing substitute decisionmaking in the abortion context could be 
implemented as well. 
Applying the standards for sterilization to the abortion problem seems logical; 
sterilization is the most closely analogous situation to abortion, although the two clearly 
differ in significant ways (most notably in that sterilization renders the woman 
permanently incapable of having a child, whereas abortion affects only a single 
pregnancy). Virginia could probably serve its legislative goals of protection of the 
mentally incompetent by enacting an abortion consent statute similar to that for consent 
to sterilization. 
PROPOSED ABORTION CONSENT STATUTE 
Applying the policy of Virginia's sterilization laws to the abortion consent 
decision, a statutory scheme for judicial consent to abortion for an incompetent might 
be as follows: 
1. The guardian must file a petition in circuit court requesting 
authorization for the abortion; 
2. The incompetent must be served with notice of the 
proceeding and an attorney must be appointed to represent 
her interests; 
3. The court must determine that: (a) the woman has been 
adjudicated incompetent under Virginia law, and (b) she is 
unlikely to become competent to make the abortion 
decision in the foreseeable future; 
4. The physician must explain to the woman, to the extent 
possible, the purpose of the abortion and the risks 
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associated with the procedure, the process of childbirth and 
the risks associated with it, and the availability of adoption 
as an alternative to aborting or raising the child; 
5. The court must attempt to elicit and consider the views of 
the woman regarding abortion; 
6. A short waiting period may be imposed (of course, the 
thirty-day period required in cases of sterilization may be 
unworkable in the abortion context); 
7. Prior to authorizing an abortion, the court must make the 
following findings: 
a) The woman is currently pregnant, the pregnancy was not 
intentional, and the woman would not choose to give birth 
were she competent; 
b) Giving birth and placing the child for adoption is not 
a reasonable alternative for the woman; 
c) The proposed method of abortion conforms with standard 
medical practice and can be carried out without 
unreasonable risk to the life; and 
d) The woman is permanently incapable of caring for and 
raising a child. 
Analyzed under this potential statutory scheme, Ann's desire to carry her 
pregnancy to term would have to be respected by the court and her parents. Although 
the adjudication of Ann's incompetence would allow the court to make the decision for 
her, the considerations mandated by the statutes would compel the court to deny any 
petition by the Smiths to order an abortion. The court would be required to consider 
Ann's wish to keep her child, although it would not be controlling. Prior to issuing 
any order authorizing the abortion, the court would be required to find that Ann is 
permanently incapable of raising a child, and that adoption would not be a reasonable 
alternative. Evidence of Ann's level of functioning would make such a finding 
virtually impossible. Ann is only mildly retarded, and she is obviously capable of 
understanding the process of childbirth. Giving birth and placing the child for adoption 
would therefore be a reasonable alternative for her. It is also quite possible that Ann 
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could learn to be an adequate parent and raise the child herself. 
Although a substituted consent statute for abortion modeled after the sterilization 
statute might be workable in a practical sense, it remains to be seen whether Virginia 
could legally enact such a statute. The proposal must be examined in tenns of 
constitutional requirements. 
CONSTI1UTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Reproductive rights is a very volatile area of constitutional law. The United 
States Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the issue in differing contexts. 
Although the extent to which the rights may be exercised varies in different situations, 
the Court has generally recognized that the right to procreate and the right to choose 
not to procreate are fundarnental.26 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,T1 the Court characterized 
the right to procreate as "one of the basic civil rights of man."2B 
The choice not to procreate generally receives more attention in litigation. The 
cases addressing this right usually deal with either contraception or abortion. 
Contraception is a basic right available to all. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,29 the Court stated 
that an individual has a right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child. "30 The right of a woman to secure an abortion, subject to certain permissible 
26 See, e.g. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to contraception 
for married persons); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to contraception 
for unmarried persons); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to choose to 
terminate pregnancy). 
'II 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
2B [d. at 541. 
29 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
30 [d. at 453. 
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restraints imposed by the state, is also fundamental.3! 
The availability of these rights to mentally retarded or incompetent individuals, 
however, is less often addressed than their availability to competent individuals, and has 
never been addressed in Virginia. There are few reported cases dealing with the 
performance of abortions upon incompetent women. The United States Supreme Court 
has not addressed the issue. The state courts that have heard such cases have generally 
held that substituted decisionmaking is appropriate to authorize an abortion on an 
incompetent woman, but have differed in the determination of who should make the 
surrogate decision and what standards should be used in deciding. 
A lower court in New York held that consent by the father to the performance 
of an abortion on his institutionalized, mentally retarded twenty-five year old daughter 
was adequate and judicial approval of the decision was unnecessary.32 In addition, the 
father was not required to use the best interests of his daughter as the standard for 
making the decision.33 An lllinois appellate court, on the other hand, held that in 
making the abortion decision, the guardian must use the best interests of the ward as 
the standard, although it was not necessary to demonstrate medical necessity for the 
procedure.34 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in denying a stay of a trial court's 
order that a guardian ad litem consent to an abortion, noted that if the woman were 
competent she would have an absolute right to terminate her pregnancy.35 The only 
question for the court, it reasoned, was whether the woman would choose abortion if 
3! Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The current status of this right is the 
topic of intense controversy. The basic right, however, still exists, having withstood, 
largely intact, the latest attack upon it in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 
_ U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). 
32 In re Barbara C., 101 A.D.2d 137, 474 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984). 
33 Id. at 139, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 801. 
34 In re Estate of D.W., 134 Ill. App. 3d 788, 481 N.E.2d 355 (1985). 
35 In re Doe, 533 A.2d 523 (R.I. 1987). 
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she were competent.36 In addition, the Supreme Court of California has indicated in 
dicta that a conservator would have power to choose an abortion for a ward.1'7 Thus, 
several states have assumed the power to allow substituted decisionmaking in the 
abortion context and have apparently been unchallenged. 
State court cases dealing with sterilization have included more in-depth analysis 
of the reproductive rights of the mentally retarded. In In re Moe,38 a Massachusetts 
appellate court was asked, in the absence of an authorizing statute, to allow a guardian 
to consent to the sterilization of an incompetent woman. The court noted that "[t]he 
right to reproduce and the decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the 
very heart of the constitutionally protected right to privacy."39 The inability of the 
incompetent to exercise this right to choose, the court felt, did not mean that the right 
was inapplicable to the incompetent.4O It was necessary, therefore, to exercise the 
woman's right to choose sterilization in an alternate way. The court held that, due to 
the intrusiveness and permanency of the sterilization operation, the guardian must obtain 
a court order authorizing consent.41 The court determined that, in deciding whether to 
issue a sterilization order, a court "should attempt to ascertain the ward's actual 
preference for sterilization, parenthood, or other means of contraception. "42 This 
decision emphasizes the importance to an incompetent woman of the right to make 
procreational choices, and identifies a means by which this right might be exercised. 
36 Id. at 526. 
1'7 Mildred G. v. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 
(1985). 
38 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982). 
39 Id. at _, 432 N.E.2d at 719. 
40 Id. at _, 432 N.E.2d at 720. 
41 Id. at _, 432 N.E.2d at 716-17. 
42 Id. at _, 432 N.E.2d at 722. 
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This concern with the right of reproductive choice, and a means to exercise it, are 
similarly reflected in the proposed Virginia statute. 
In Mildred G. v. Valerie N.,43 the legality of a California statute prohibiting the 
sterilization of incompetent individuals was challenged. The California Supreme Court 
held that the law unconstitutionally deprived incompetent individuals of their liberty and 
privacy interests in procreative choice.44 Incompetent women, according to the court, 
must have available to them the same contraceptive choices available to competent 
women, including sterilization. Nonetheless, the court recognized that an incompetent 
woman would be unable to realistically exercise the choice available to her. It 
concluded, therefore, that "[t]rue protection of procreative choice can be accomplished 
only if the state permits the court-supervised substituted judgment of the conservator to 
be exercised on behalf of a conservator who is unable to personally exercise this 
right."4.5 As with the Massachusetts decision, the proposed Virginia law addresses the 
concerns of the court regarding reproductive choice and offers a potential solution. 
Chief Justice Bird entered a strong dissent to the decision in Valerie N .. 46 She 
found serious problems with the majority's characterization of the possibility of 
substituted consent, writing as follows: 
Today's holding will permit the state, through the legal fiction of 
substituted consent, to deprive many women permanently of the right to 
conceive and bear children. The majority run roughshod over this 
fundamental constitutional right in a misguided attempt to guarantee a 
right of procreative choice or one they assume has never been capable 
of choice and never will be. Yet precisely because choice and consent 
are meaningless concepts when applied to such a person, the majority's 
invocation of the theory of procreative choice and the fiction of 
substituted consent cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.47 
43 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985). 
44 Id. at 160-61, 707 P.2d at 771-72, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 399. 
4.5 Id. at 168, 707 P.2d at 777, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 404. 
46 Id. at 174, 707 P.2d at 781, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). 
47Id. at 174-75, 707 P.2d at 781-82, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09. 
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Bird disagreed with the majority's unsupported conclusion that the conservator could 
authorize an abortion for the conservatee.48 She argued that abortion only occurs as a 
result of choice, which is meaningless to one incapable of choosing. She characterized 
the right to procreate, on the other hand, not as a result of choice, but rather as a 
deeper, constitutional right.49 According to Bird, the right of an incompetent woman to 
procreate is not diminished by her incompetence because it is not a function of a 
capacity to make informed decisions; her right to make reproductive choices, on the 
other hand, is a function of the capacity to make informed decisions and is therefore 
diminished by incompetence. 50 Under Bird's analysis, a law allowing substituted 
consent for abortion would not be upheld because the incompetent's right to procreate 
is to be respected above any fictional attempt to allow choice to a woman incapable of 
exercising it. Bird's view, however, is not that of the majority. 
Some commentators argue that the right to procreate is a function of mep.tal 
capacity because it involves the exercise of an informed choice. Scott believes that the 
right to procreate involves the right to produce children to rear, and thus requires the 
intention and ability to parent.SI She suggests that the right to bear a child is not 
available to a woman who is incapable of caring for a child, while a woman with 
adequate mental capacity to parent has a legally protected interest in procreation.52 She 
would employ the standard used to terminate parental rights in determining whether the 
woman is capable of becoming a parent.S3 Her concerns regarding parenting capacity 
48 [d. at 183, 707 P.2d at 787-88, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15. 
49 [d. at 181-82, 707 P.2d at 786, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 413. 
50 [d. at 182, 707 P.2d at 786-87, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 414. 
SI Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and 
Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.I. 806, 829 (1986). 
52 [d. at 831, 850. 
S3 [d. at 833. 
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are addressed by provision 3 in the proposed statute requiring that the court find that 
a woman is permanently incapable of raising a child prior to issuing an order for an 
abortion. 
Robertson similarly suggests that the right to procreate depends upon mental 
capacity. He argues that true reproductive choice encompasses both the right not to 
procreate and the right to procreate.S4 He believes that the right to procreate depends 
not upon the ability to parent, but upon the ability to comprehend the significance of 
procreation.15 Under his model, compelling abortion upon a mildly mentally retarded 
woman capable of understanding the significance of procreation, whether or not she is 
fit to parent, would infringe upon her right of procreation.56 The proposed statute 
allows procreational rights to all who deserve them according to Robertson's scheme. 
In order to authorize an abortion, the court is required to fmd that the woman is unfit 
to parent and that adoption is not a reasonable option for her. If the court finds that 
adoption is an option for the woman because, although she is incapable of parenting, 
she can comprehend the process of childbirth and wishes to experience it, it must allow 
her to give birth. 
The general conclusion of most courts that have considered the issue of 
reproductive rights of the incompetent is that the right to procreate or not to procreate 
is a personal right which cannot be denied simply because the individual is mentally 
disabled. As a result, the right can be exercised for the person by another. The 
proposed statutory scheme provides a means to assure the mentally incompetent in 
Virginia the same reproductive choices available to competent women, and therefore, 
properly complies with constitutional requirements. 
S4 Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and 
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 406, 463 (1983). 
15 [d. at 413. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although significant changes in the law regarding the reproductive rights of 
incompetents have occurred since the days of Buck v. Bell,S? Virginia's current law 
contains significant ambiguities regarding perfonnance of abortions upon incompetent 
women. The statute requires consent of a guardian to the procedure, but provides no 
means by which such consent can be given. In addition, it fails to specify whether the 
consent of the incompetent woman or the consent of the guardian is controlling in cases 
in which there is conflict. No statute authorizes courts to resolve such conflicts. 
Virginia law does, however, allow substituted consent to sterilization and other medical 
treatment, but specifically excludes abortion from the operation of the authorizing 
statutes. Therefore, under current Virginia law, it is not legal to perfonn an abortion 
upon an incompetent woman who has not consented to the procedure regardless of 
consent by her guardian. 
The Virginia legislature could, however, enact a statute allowing for judicial 
authorization of perfonnance of abortions upon incompetent women. Were the law to 
be modeled after the current statute for involuntary sterilization, it would serve the 
state's policy goals of protection of the rights of the mentally incompetent. Although 
courts have expressed concern regarding the wishes of the incompetent, a statute which 
mandated consideration of the expressed views of the incompetent would likely be legal. 
S? 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
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ST ANDARDS OF SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT 
FOR APPLYING SURROGATE TREATMENT DECISIONMAKING 
FOR INCOMPETENT ADULTS IN VffiGINIA 
Melanie F. Michaelson 
INTRODucnON 
In the Spring, 1990, issue of the Colonial Lawyer, 1 Deborah A. Ryan criticized 
the Virginia Natural Death Act and its narrow definition of persistent vegetative state.2 
This article will discuss Section 37.1-134.4 of the Virginia Code that authorizes, among 
other things, an appointed surrogate to provide, withhold, and withdraw life-sustaining 
medical treatment for certain incompetent persons.3 This statute is one of the most 
progressive in the country, as evidenced by the number of cases from other jurisdictions 
that underscore their state legislature's lack of action in this area.4 
Because Section 37.1-134.4 is a relatively new statute, Virginia courts have little 
statutory interpretation. As a result, Virginia must look to decisions in other state 
courts in order to give guidance to those making health care decisions for an 
incompetent adult. This article will first discuss the requirements of the statute itself 
and then address the medical evidence necessary to support the different standards of 
substitute judgment decisionmaking. Next, the article will discuss the three different 
standards of substitute judgment available to a decisionmaker when fulfilling the 
statute's requirements: (1) the substitute-intent standard, (2) the limited-objective 
standard, and (3) the pure-objective standard. These standards will then be balanced 
1 Ryan, Virginia's Natural Death Act: Is It Useful to Individuals in a 
Persistent Vegetative State?, 19 COL. LAW. 34 (1990). 
2 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
3 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Supp. 1990). See Appendix A. 
4 See cases discussed infra. 
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against five state interests: (1) preserving life, (2) protecting innocent third parties, (3) 
preventing suicide, (4) maintaining the medical profession's ethical integrity, and (5) the 
cost of medical care. Finally, the article will conclude that Virginia has provided a 
workable solution for surrogates making medical decisions for incompetent adults. 
THE VIRGINIA SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING STATUTE 
In Section 37.1-134.4 of the Virginia Code, the Virginia General Assembly has 
provided for substituted consent to medical treatment in the case of an incompetent and 
terminally ill adult patient.s Since the General Assembly has already weighed the 
S VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Supp. 1990). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2986 (1988). This statute, the Natural Death Act, limits substituted consent 
decisionmaking by providing that: 
Life-prolonging procedures may be withheld or withdrawn from an 
adult patient with a terminal condition who (i) is comatose, 
incompetent or otherwise physically or mentally incapable of 
communication and (ii) has not made a declaration in accordance with 
this article, provided there is consultation and agreement for the 
withholding or the withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures between 
the attending physician and [certain individuals to refuse treatment on 
behalf of the patient]. 
See also, Note, The 'Terminal Condition' Condition in Virginia's Natural 
Death Act, 73 VA. L. REv. 749, 750 (1987). Under the Natural Death Act, a patient 
has a "terminal condition" if "there is 'a reasonable degree of medical certainty [that] 
(i) there can be no recovery and (ii) [the patient's] death is imminent.'" [d. (quoting 
V A. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (1988». Under the statute, life-prolonging procedures 
may be withdrawn from only a "qualified patient." [d. at n.8. A "qualified patient" 
is defined as one who has a "terminal condition." [d. "Terminal," however, does 
not clearly define a medical condition. [d. Colloquially, "terminal" is equated with 
incurability. [d. In medicine, however, many chronic diseases, such as chronic 
congestive heart failure, are rarely terminal. [d. For medical purposes, the word 
"imminent" is rarely defmed. [d. at 150 n.11. 
See also, Note, The Virginia Natural Death Act - A Critical Analysis 17 U. 
RICH. L. R. 863, 871-72 (1983) [hereinafter Critical Analysis]. But see Letter From 
Attorney General Gerald L. Baliles to The Honorable G. Steven Agee, Member, 
House of Delegates (August 2, 1983), regarding the issue of whether one may, 
pursuant to the Virginia Natural Death Act, have the use of kidney dialysis, 
intravenous feeding, and oxygen withdrawn or terminated as life-prolonging 
procedures under the provisions of VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (1988): 
A different result would undoubtedly follow if oxygen were administered by 
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benefits and burdens of substituted consent,6 this article will focus on the standards that 
are available to the decisionmaker making a substituted judgment for an incompetent 
adult. By restricting this article to the case of an adult who was formerly competent, 
this article avoids the slippery slope argument, predicting that the use of substituted 
judgment will result in the forced termination of care for society'S "undesirables," that 
is more readily available when the adult always lacked competency.' The case of an 
adult who could never have been found competent is similar to the more difficult cases 
of infants, children, and other so-called "incompetents," such as the mentally retarded, 
where federal statutes may be implicated.8 For this reason, these cases are beyond the 
scope of this article. 
In examining the standards the decisionmaker may utilize, this article assumes 
that the identity of the decisionmaker is not relevant to the choice of the standard used. 
The Virginia Statute lists the order of priority of those who may authorize the 
withholding or withdrawal of treatment: (1) anyone given such authority in a writing 
pursuant to Virginia Code Section 54.1-2984; (2) an authorized guardian; (3) anyone 
appointed under a durable power of attorney that grants such authority to decide, 
different means for the purpose of supplanting the spontaneous function of 
breathing; similarly, a different result would undoubtedly follow if intravenous 
feeding was not for the purpose of providing comfort against dehydration but 
was mainly for the purpose of supplanting the spontaneous functions of 
receiving necessary nourishment into the body in amounts adequate to 
maintain life. In both situations, of course, before terminating the procedure, 
it would be necessary for the physician first to find that the patient was in a 
terminal condition and that the process served only to prolong the dying 
process. 
6 See Critical Analysis, supra note 5, at 870-71. 
, See Matter of Storar and Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 
N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). 
8 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5106a-5106h (1988) (The Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act requires that states, in order to receive certain federal funds, meet 
certain legal and administrative standards ensuring that the state's protective services 
respond to "medical neglect" cases). 
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provided that they are not employed by the doctor or anyone employing the doctor; (4) 
a husband or wife; (5) an adult child; (6) parent(s); (7) an adult sibling; or (8) any 
other relative, to be decided in descending order of blood relationship.9 Any of these 
individuals should come to the same conclusions when applying the standards set forth 
in this article. 
Section 37.1-134.4 of the Virginia Codelo specifies procedures available for 
surrogate treatment decisionmaking. 11 While the statute mandates that the surrogate 
base his decision on the "best interests" of the person, the statute contains language that 
requires the surrogate to consider factors that are clearly part of the "substituted intent" 
standard. The statute provides, for example, that it does "not authorize providing, 
continuing to provide, withholding or withdrawing treatment if the [person providing] 
the treatment knows or upon reasonable inquiry ought to know that such an action is 
protested by the person."12 Also, no person can authorize treatment that he knows, or 
ought to know, "is contrary to the religious beliefs or basic values of the person unable 
9 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4(B) (Supp. 1990); See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9.1 
to - 11-9.2 (1989) (concerning durable power of attorney); see Appendix B. But see 
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (1988). The order of priority of the decision makers in 
Section 54.1-2986 of the Natural Death Act is as follows: 
1. The judicially appointed guardian or committee of the patient if one 
has been appointed . . . ; or 
2. The person or persons designated by the patient in writing to make 
the treatment decision for him should he be diagnosed as suffering 
from a terminal condition; or 
3. The patient's spouse; or 
4. An adult child of the patient or, if the patient has more than one 
adult child, by a majority of the children who are reasonably available 
for consultation; or 
5. The parents of the patient; or 
6. The nearest living relative of the patient. 
10 V A. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Supp. 1990). 
11 [d. at § 37.1-134.4(H). 
12 [d. at § 37.1-134.4(0) (Supp. 1990). 
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to make a decision, whether [the beliefs or values are] expressed orally or in writing."n 
These factors require the decisionmaker to try to determine what the individual would 
have wanted, and not what the decisionmaker, in the flrst instance, believes to be in the 
"best interests" of the incompetent individual. Therefore, in interpreting this statute, the 
courts should view the statute as creating a hybrid "substitute intent" -- "best interest" 
standard. 
THE DOCfRINE OF SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT 
To examine the standards of the doctrine of substitute judgment, the doctrine 
itself must be clearly defined. The law supports the idea that incompetence does not 
deprive an individual of the right to decide treatment questions. 14 This right remains 
as if the patient were still competent. IS Someone else, however, must exercise this right 
for the incompetent individual.16 The decision is a substitute for the patient's own, and 
is therefore called "substitute judgment."17 The law recognizes a constitutional right to 
"bodily privacy, found in the penumbras of various fundamental rights .... "18 Along 
with the tort principles that prohibit nonconsensual touching,19 that right to bodily 
13 Id. 
14 D. MEYERS, MEDIco-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATII AND DYING § 15:2, at 470 
(1981). 
IS Id. at 471 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977»; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 
(1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976». 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Brant, The Right To Die in Peace: Substituted Consent And The Mentally 
Incompetent, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 959, 960 (1977). 
19 Id. at 961 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. CiT. 1972), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (competent adults may determine when they will 
consent to treatment); Schloendorff v. Soc. of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 126, 105 
N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (surgeon performing operation without adult patient's consent 
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privacy can be extended to disallow medical care without the patient's infonned 
consent.20 The doctrine of substitute judgment extends this right to the incompetent 
individual who is not able to grant his/her consent by allowing another to act for the 
incompetent in a manner consistent with the incompetent's wishes had he/she remained 
competent.21 
The number of cases discussing this doctrine has increased due to the advances 
in medical technology that have allowed a person with "minimal brain functioning" to 
be sustained without being deemed brain dead.22 Courts, however, have been grappling 
with the issues of whether, when and by whom medical treatment may be withdrawn 
from an incompetent person since Karen Quinlan lapsed into a coma on April 15, 
1975.23 The courts are still looking for answers. Most recently, with the case of Nancy 
commits assault). 
20 Id. (citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 35, _, 355 A.2d 647, 662 (1976) (court 
allowed patient in vegetative state to be withdrawn from respirator». 
21 Weber, Substitute Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN L. & 
MIlO. 131, 135 (1985). 
22 John F. Kennedy Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984). 
As the court in Bludworth stated: 
Id. 
It is now possible to hold such persons on the threshold of death for 
an indeterminate period of time by utilizing extraordinary mechanical 
or other artificial means to sustain their vital bodily functions. The 
procedures used can be accurately described as a means of prolonging 
the dying process rather than a means of continuing life. 
The Florida Supreme Court held that in the case of a terminally ill and 
comatose patient who had executed a "living" will, "it is not necessary that a court-
appointed guardian of his person obtain approval of [the] court ... before 
tenninating extraordinary life support systems in order for consenting family 
members, attending physicians, and hospital and its administrators to be relieved of 
civil and criminal liability .... " Id. at 926. Merely good faith is necessary. Id. 
23 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, _, 355 A.2d 647, 653-54 (1976). On April 15, 
1975, Karen Quinlan stopped breathing at least twice, for fifteen-minute periods at a 
time. Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 653-54. She was left in a persistent vegetative state. 
Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 654. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the right to 
tenninate her life by removing her life-support was incident to her right of privacy 
which could be asserted on her behalf by her guardian. Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 664. 
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Cruzan, the Supreme Court essentially left the states free to detennine the standards they 
will require before allowing the withdrawal of medical care, including food and water, 
from an incompetent individual.24 As Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe 
notes, however, the Cruzan case reveals the unprecedented recognition by eight Supreme 
Court justices of some degree of constitutional protection for the "right to die. "25 These 
cases continue to arise because the courts have failed to spell out standards for the 
substitute decisionmaker to apply in detennining what the incompetent patient would 
decide if still competent. 
MEDICAL EVIDENCE 
When making a health-care decision for an incompetent, the decisionmaker must 
decide and carry out, to the degree possible, the care the individual, if competent, would 
have chosen.26 The court in In re Peter, however, noted that before making any health-
care decisions, the decisionmaker must understand the patient's medical condition and 
likelihood of recovery.27 Therefore, "[t]he focal point of such decisions should be 
24 See Cruzan ex rei. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en 
banc). Nancy Cruzan was left in a persistent vegetative state after an auto accident 
deprived her brain of oxygen for an estimated twelve to fourteen minutes (the trial 
judge found that deprivation of six minutes results in permanent brain damage). Id. 
at 410-11. When efforts to rehabilitate Nancy over a substantial period of time 
failed, her parents (acting as her guardians) sought a judicial order sanctioning their 
belief that Nancy would want her artificial nutrition and hydration tenninated. Id. 
The Circuit Court ordered that the request be carried out, id. at 411, but the 
Missouri Supreme Court reversed this decision, noting the state policy of preserving 
life and finding no "legal basis which pennits the coguardians in this case to choose 
the death of the ward." The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri 
Supreme Court decision in Cruzan ex rei. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of 
Health, _ U.S. _, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). 
25 The Washington Post, July 2, 1990, at A5, col. 1. 
26 N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 63 (1987) [hereinafter 
CANTOR] (citing In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985». 
'E1 In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, _, 529 A.2d 419, 428 (1987). In 1984 Hilda 
Peter lapsed into a persistent vegetative state. Id. at _, 529 A.2d at 428. Ms. 
Peter had effected a power of attorney, which authorized her friend, Eberhard 
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whether there is a reasonable medical expectation of the patient's return to a cognitive 
life as distinguished from the forced continuance of a vegetative existence. "28 This 
inquiry can be made by looking for two factors set out by the court in Foody v. 
Manchester Memorial Hospital: (1) "the incapable patient's condition ... is pennanent 
and irreversible and there is no reasonable medical probability that the patient ever will 
return to a cognitive state, [and] (2) the patient's attending physician together with at 
least two other consulting physicians unanimously concur as to the patient's condition 
•••• "29 These factors insure that the patient truly requires a substitute decision maker 
to carry out his wishes regarding increased or continued medical care. 
Once the decisionmaker determines that the patient has no reasonable possibility 
of regaining his or her cognitive abilities, the decisionmaker should begin to weigh the 
other medical factors. The court in the Peter case followed Quinlan concluding "that 
Johanning, to make her health-care decisions. [d. at _, 529 A.2d at 422. As her 
guardian, Johanning requested that Peter's nasogastric tube be withdrawn. [d. at _, 
529 A.2d at 422. The New Jersey Supreme Court set the standard of proof 
necessary to avoid judicial review in a substituted judgment case as clear and 
convincing. [d. at _, 529 A.2d at 427. See also VA. CoDE ANN. § 37.1-134.4(E) 
(Supp. 1990). This section provides that: 
Prior to the initiation or cessation of treatment for which authorization has 
been obtained or will be sought pursuant to this section, and no less 
frequently than every 180 days while the treatment continues, the physician 
shall obtain a written certification that the person is incapable of making an 
informed decision regarding the treatment This certification shall be made 
by a licensed physician or licensed clinical psychologist who is not otherwise 
currently involved in the treatment of the person assessed and shall be based 
on a personal examination of the person. The cost of the assessment shall be 
considered for all purposes a cost of the treatment provided. 
28 John F. Kennedy Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984). 
29 Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, _, 482 A.2d 
713, 721 (1984). Sandra Foody had suffered from severe multiple sclerosis for 24 
years, when, at age 42, she "suffered a respiratory arrest" leaving her unable to 
breathe without a respirator and in a semicomatose state. [d. at _, 482 A.2d at 
715-16. Her family brought an action to restrain the hospital staff and doctors from 
using artificial means to continue Sandra's breathing and heart rate. [d. at _, 482 
A.2d at 713. The court ruled in favor of allowing a substitute decision to be made 
for Sandra because there was no state interest sufficient to override her rights. [d. at 
_, 482 A.2d at 720. 
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the life-expectancy of the patient ... is not an important criterion," especially when the 
patient is in a persistent vegetative state.30 Nancy Cruzan, for example, could live in 
such a state for thirty more years?! 
The court in Barber v. Superior Court stated that a determination should be 
made as to whether the proposed treatment will benefit or burden the patient.32 The 
court then explained that "the determination as to whether the burdens of treatment are 
worth enduring for any individual patient depends on facts unique to each case, namely, 
how long the treatment is likely to extend life and under what conditions.'t33 The New 
Jersey court, however, in In re Conroy,34 noted that the focus should be upon the 
patient's "experience of pain and enjoyment [and] not the type of treatment involved."3.'5 
The decisionmaker should not allow a certain treatment because it appears to be only 
slightly invasive of the patient's body if that treatment has little probability of ultimately 
returning the patient to a cognitively functioning state. Conversely, a highly invasive 
30 Peter, 108 N.J. at _, 529 A.2d at 424. 
3! Cruzan ex rei. Cruzan v. Harmon 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en 
banc), aff d Cruzan ex rei. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, _ U.S. 
_, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). 
32 Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 
491 (1983). In Barber, two physicians were charged with murder and conspiracy to 
commit murder because they removed the patient's intravenous tubes and 
discontinued life-support pursuant to a request by the patient's family. Id. at 1010-
11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. The court found, inter alia, that the doctors' failure to 
continue life-sustaining treatment, although "intentional and with knowledge" of 
certain death for the patient, did not constitute "an unlawful failure to perform [their] 
legal duty." Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491-93. 
33 Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492. 
34 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). 
3S Id. at _, 486 A.2d at 1233. The patient, an eighty-four-year-old woman 
w~th a limited time to live, confined to bed and living in a nursing home, was both 
physically and mentally impaired. Her nephew, acting as guardian, sought to have 
her feeding tube removed. Id. at _, 486 A.2d at 1216. The court continued to 
review the case even though Claire Conroy died before it reached the New Jersey 
Appellate Division. Id. at _, 486 A.2d at 1219. 
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treatment should not be denied if it has a strong probability of aiding the patient.36 
Bec.ause the goal of a substitute decisionmaker is to give effect to the patient's 
rights, the Conroy court stated that the decisionmaker must base his or her decision on 
"at least as much medical infonnation" as a competent person would have.37 The court 
then suggested an extensive list of medical evidence upon which to base this decision, 
including: 
evidence about the patient's present level of physical, sensory, emotional, 
and cognitive functioning; the degree of physical pain resulting from the 
medical condition, treatment, and termination of treatment, respectively; 
the degree of humiliation, dependence, and loss of dignity probably 
resulting from the condition and treatment; . . . the various treatment 
options; and the risks, side effects, and benefits of each of these options.38 
The court concluded that by considering these factors the decisionmaker avoids the error 
of basing his conclusions on a hastily made diagnosis or prognosis.39 This infonnation 
will also help the decisionmaker decide whether the treatment benefits or burdens the 
patient and whether the patient's condition is clearly irreversible. 
STANDARDS FOR APPLYING 
SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT DECISIONMAKING 
Substitute-Intent Standard 
The substitute intent standard is the strictest of the substitute judgment standards 
of decisionmaking. Once the decisionmaker has examined all aspects of the patient's 
proposed and current medical care, he then must decide what the patient's preferences 
would be in the present situation.40 In order to determine a patient's preference, the 
36 Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. 
37 Conroy, 98 N.J. at _, 486 A2d at 1231. 
38 Id. at _, 486 A.2d at 1231. 
39 Id. at _, 486 A2d at 1231. 
40 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _, 486 A2d 1209, 1229 (1985). 
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decisionmaker must determine, as accurately as possible, the wants and needs of the 
incompetent individua1.41 As noted by the court in Foody, this is an individual standard, 
and may not necessarily "conform to what the majority deems wise or prudent."42 The 
patient's previous statements provide the best way to judge what he would choose. The 
clearest evidence of this is usually a "living will" that clearly specifies the patient's 
wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment.43 Since Virginia recognizes living wills as 
legally binding, such advance directives are relevant evidence of the patient's intent.44 
The New Jersey court in the case of In re Peter noted that the patient had executed a 
power of attorney authorizing a friend to make all of her health-care decisions.45 A 
writing is very suggestive of an individual's "seriousness of purpose. "46 Also, a person 
who takes the time to set out his wishes in writing will more likely ensure that any 
changes are subsequently recorded.41 According to Virginia law, however, the absence 
of a "living will" does not raise a presumption regarding a patient's intention with 
41 Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 
492 (1983). 
42 Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at _, 482 A.2d at 720. 
43 In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, _, 529 A.2d 419, 426 (1987). A Living Will is 
defined as "[a] written directive by an adult patient authorizing the withholding or 
withdrawal of extraordinary life-sustaining procedures in the situation of tenninal 
illness." I. SLOAN, THE RIGHT To DIE: LEGAL AND ETIlICAL PROBlEMS 142 (1988). 
44 See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2984 (1988 & Supp. 1990); Appendix B. 
45 Peter, 108 N.J. at _, 529 A.2d at 422. 
46 In re Westchester County Medical Center, ex rei. Mary O'Connor, 72 
N.Y.2d 517, 531, 531 N.E.2d flJ7, 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988). Mary 
O'Connor was an elderly, hospitalized individual, had suffered several strokes, and, 
as a result, was mentally incompetent and incapable of receiving nourishment without 
medical assistance. The hospital sought a court order permitting them to insert a 
nasogastric tube that was objected to by Mrs. O'Connor's daughters. Id. at 523-34, 
531 N.E.2d at flJ8, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88. The court ruled in favor of the 
hospital because there was no clear and convincing evidence that she would not want 
the tube inserted. Id. at 530-34, 531 N.E.2d at 613-15, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892. 
41 Id., 531 N.E.2d at 613-14, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93. 
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regard to life-sustaining procedures.48 
The decision maker may also be guided by statements made by the patient before 
he became incompetent. For example, a decisionmaker may consider a patient's 
verbalized response to medical treatment previously administered to another.49 In the 
case of In re Jobes,$) the court observed that the incompetent's husband remembered 
his wife stating that "she would not want to be kept alive under Karen Quinlan'S 
circumstances." She made these comments frequently in 1976 and 1977, when the 
Quinlan case was making news.51 However, as Conroy stated, "the probative value of 
such evidence [demonstrating intent] may vary depending on the remoteness, 
consistency, and thoughtfulness of the prior statements or actions and the maturity of 
the person at the time of the statements or acts."Sl The court in Cruzan v. Harmon was 
reluctant to accept statements that Nancy had made to friends that if she were "sick or 
injured she would not want to continue [living] unless she could live 'halfway 
normal. "'53 Regardless of the problems with a patient's prior statements, respect for 
patient autonomy requires that every effort be made to carry out the patient's own 
preferences as previously communicated.54 
48 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (1988). 
49 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-30 (1985). 
so 108 N.J. 394, 529 A2d 434 (1987). 
51 Id. at _, 529 A2d at 442. Nancy Jobes was thirty-one years old and four 
and one-half months pregnant when she was admitted to the hospital for treatment of 
injuries received in a car accident. Physicians determined that the fetus had been 
killed. During an operation to remove the fetus, she suffered brain damage due to 
the loss of blood and oxygen flow to her brain. Id. at _, 529 A.2d at 437. She 
never regained consciousness, Id. at _, 529 A2d at 438. Her husband brought an 
action seeking removal of the hydration and nutrition that was keeping his wife 
alive. Id. at _, 529 A.2d at 437. 
52 Conroy, 98 N.J. at _, 486 A2d at 1230. 
53 Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411. 
54 CANfOR, supra note 26, at 64. 
141 
Less direct evidence of intent may also be examined, including the patient's 
religious beliefs, or a "consistent pattern of conduct" regarding prior medical treatment.55 
The court in Jobes explained that: 
The surrogate considers the patient's prior statements about and reactions 
to medical issues, and all the facets of the patient's personality that the 
surrogate is familiar with - with, of course, particular reference to his or 
her relevant philosophical, theological, and ethical values - in order to 
extrapolate what course of medical treatment the patient would choose. S6 
The court in In re Quinlan noted that Karen's father consulted with his parish priest 
and the hospital chaplain in order "[t]o confirm the moral rightness of the decision he 
was about to make . . . . "S7 Karen's father testifled that he would not have sought 
termination of the life support if the act conflicted with the tenets of his religion.58 The 
New York court in O'Connor explained that the persistence, seriousness and context of 
the individual's statements regarding the termination of life-supports are among those 
factors which help convince the decisionmaker that the strength and durability of the 
patient's "beliefs makes a recent change of heart unlikely."59 In this way, the 
decision maker effectively carries out the patient's wishes about medical care. 
Limited-Objective Standard 
The court in Conroy established two alternative tests under which treatment 
might be withheld or tenninated when the medical information is insufficient or the 
55 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _, 486 A.2d 1233, 1230 (1985). 
S6 Jobes, 108 N.J. at _, 529 A.2d at 444. 
S7 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at _, 355 A.2d at 658. 
58 Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 658. 
59 O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 517, 531, 531 N.E.2d at 607, 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 
886, 892. 
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patient's intention is unknown: a limited-objective test and a pure-objective test.60 The 
Conroy court characterized these tests as "best interest" tests.61 In order to withhold 
treatment the limited-objective test requires (1) that the decisionmaker find some 
"reasonably reliable evidence that [indicates] the patient would have refused the 
treatment if competent"62 ... and (2) "that the burdens of administering the treatment 
outweigh the benefits of' living in the patient's present condition.63 The court in 
Conroy "defined these burdens as [the] unavoidable pain and suffering that would be 
present throughout the remainder of the patient's life."M 
The limited-objective test requires some evidence that the patient would not have 
wanted the treatment or "would have wanted the treatment terminated." The criteria set 
out above for the subjective intent test, however, need not be satisfied.6S That is, 
"[e]vidence that, taken as a whole, would be too vague, casual, or remote to constitute 
the clear proof of the patient's subjective intent ... might be sufficient to satisfy [the 
prong] of the limited objective test" requiring evidence that the patient would have 
desired termination of treatment.66 The court in 0' Connor noted the testimony of Mrs. 
O'Connor's daughter that her mother told her several times "that if she became ill and 
60 Note, Barber v. Superior Court: Removing Food And Water From A 
Terminally Ill, Comatose Patient -- Who Decides? 17 Sw. V.L. REv. 109, 126 
(1987-88) [hereinafter Who Decides] (citing Conroy, 98 N.J. at _, 486 A.2d at 
1231-32). 
61 Conroy, 98 N.J. at _, 486 A.2d at 1231-32. 
62 Who Decides, supra note 60, at 127. 
63 Id. at 127 (citing In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 
(1985)). 
MId. 
6S Conroy, 98 N.J. at _, 486 A.2d at 1232. 
66 Id. at _, 486 A.2d at 1232. 
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[could not] care for herself she would not want to be sustained" by life-support.67 This 
is an example of the evidence that the decisionmaker should use when applying this 
standard. The limited-objective standard allows for withdrawing or withholding 
treatment from an individual who has not sufficiently expressed any intention regarding 
the type of treatment to be administered when suffering would only be prolonged by 
the administration of such treatment.6B 
Pure-Objective Standard 
Conroy provided, finally, that where there is no "trustworthy evidence," or even 
evidence at all, that the patient would not have wanted the treatment offered, life-
sustaining care may be terminated or withheld if a "pure-objective test" is met.69 Under 
the pure-objective test, the burdens of the individual's life if treatment is given should 
"clearly and markedly" override the benefits an individual derives from living.70 Also, 
where the "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain" of living with the life-sustaining 
treatment makes that type of treatment inhumane, it should be discontinued or withheld 
from the patient.7! No subjective evidence is necessary under this standard. However, 
if the patient had previously stated any desire to remain alive despite any suffering or 
pain, the treatment should continue.72 Because there was little or no evidence as to the 
pain the patient was experiencing, or would experience, or her ability to feel pleasure, 
67 O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 527, 531 N.E.2d 607, 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 
890. 
6B Who Decides, supra note 60, at 127. 
69 Conroy, 98 N.J. at _, 486 A2d at 1232. 
70 Id. at _, 486 A2d at 1232. 
71 Id. at _, 486 A2d at 1232. 
72 Id. at _, 486 A2d at 1232. 
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the court in Conroy refused to apply even this standard.73 
SUMMARY OF EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS 
In summarizing the evidence that requires consideration in determining whether 
one of the three standards -- substitute-intent, limited-objective or pure-objective -- may 
be utilized by a substitute decisionmaker, the concurring opinion in O'Connor provided 
the seven most significant factors: 
(1) the intention of the patient under the eXIstmg circumstances, to 
whatever extent it can be ascertained from past expressions; (2) any 
moral, ethical, religious or other deeply held belief, insofar as it might 
bear on the patient's probable inclinations in the matter; (3) the medical 
condition of the patient, including the level of mental and physical 
functioning and the degree of pain and discomfort; (4) the nature of the 
prescribed medical assistance, including its benefits, risks, invasiveness, 
painfulness, and side effects; (5) the prognoses with and without the 
medical assistance, including life expectancy, suffering and possibility of 
recovery; (6) the sentiments of the family or intimate friend; and (7) the 
professional judgment of the involved physicians.74 
When the decisionmaker has applied the above standards, he must then be "manifestly 
satisfied" that the facts support the use of one of the substitute intentlbest interest 
tests.75 However, if a petition is brought to a Virginia Circuit Court regarding the 
decision that has been reached, the court may "enjoin such action upon finding by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the action is not lawfully authorized by this section 
and that the action is not otherwise authorized by state or federal law. "76 Therefore, the 
decision is not free of judicial review if there is disagreement over a choice of 
73 Conroy, 98 N.J. at _, 486 A.2d at 1243. 
74 O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 537, 531 N.E.2d 607, 617, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 
896 (1988) (emphasis in original). 
75 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (1985). The Conroy 
court analogized to In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, _, 426 A.2d 467, 483 (1981), where 
the court required a clear and convincing standard before approval for the 
sterilization of a mentally retarded, incompetent adult. 
76 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4(F) (Supp. 1990). 
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treatment. This should ease the minds of those who fear unfettered decisionmaking 
resulting in active or passive euthanasia.77 
In closing, the court in Conroy issued a cautionary note to those trying to 
implement one of the three standards: 
it will frequently be difficult to conclude that the evidence is sufficient 
to justify termination of treatment under either of the "best interests" tests. 
. .. Often, it is unclear whether and to what extent a patient . . . is 
capable of, or is in fact, experiencing pain. Similarly, medical experts 
are often unable to determine with any degree of certainty the extent of 
a nonverbal person's intellectual functioning or the depth of his emotional 
life. When the evidence is insufficient to satisfy either the limited-
objective or pure-objective standard, however, we cannot justify the 
termination of life-sustaining treatment as clearly furthering the best 
interests of ... [the] patient.78 
The court based this final conclusion on the presumption that, "[w]hen evidence of a 
person's wishes or physical or mental condition is equivocal, it is best to err, if at all, 
in favor of preserving life. "79 This statement of public policy ties into the state interests 
discussed in the following section. The line between the three tests is not always clear, 
nor is the line between the interests of the individuals and those of the state. However, 
this may be advantageous because the lines change as the facts change, therefore 
providing for specific decisions for specific individuals rather than static rules. 
STATE INTERESTS 
The three standards providing guidance to a health-care decisionmaker for an 
incompetent adult focus almost entirely on the individual. These standards must 
therefore be balanced against five state interests: (l) preserving life, (2) protecting 
innocent third parties, (3) preventing suicide, (4) maintaining the "ethical integrity" of 
77 B. HASFORD, MAKING YoUR MEDICAL DECISIONS 17-18 (1982). 
78 Conroy, 98 N.J. at _, 486 A.2d at 1233. 
79 [d. at _, 486 A.2d at 1233. 
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the medical profession,so and (5) the costs of medical care. As the Conroy court 
recognized, the state's interest in preserving life is often considered the most significant 
of the five interests.8i This interest embraces two separate but related concerns: an 
interest in preserving the patient's life and an interest in preserving the sanctity of all 
life.82 However, as the dissent in Cruzan noted, the state recognizes a "relativity of 
values" concerning life because it often carries out capital punishment and it often 
recognizes the "[l]iving [w] ill " which "allows and encourages the pre-planned 
termination of life .... "83 Also, as the court in Quinlan observed, the state's interest 
in preserving life is neither static nor absolute. The state interest "weakens and the 
individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the 
prognosis dims."84 Ultimately there is a point where the privacy right of the individual 
overcomes the interest of the state.8S The state interest in preserving life extends to the 
protection of innocent third parties.86 The patient's rights "must frequently give way," 
as noted in Conroy, where the exercise of "his choice could adversely and directly 
affect the health, safety, or security of others .... "87 
Third, the state has an interest in preventing suicide. However, as the court in 
so Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking For Incompetents, 29 UCLA 
L. REv. 390-91 (1981). See also Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. 
Supp. 127, _, 482 A.2d 713, 718 (1984); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _, 486 
A.2d 1209, 1233 (1985). 
81 Conroy, 98 N.J. at _, 486 A.2d at 1233. 
82 Cruzan, ex rei. Cruzan by Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988) (en 
bane), aff d Cruzan ex rei. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, _ U.S. 
_, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). 
83 Id. at 428-29 (Blackmar, J., dissenting). 
84 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, _, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976). 
8S Id. at _, 355 A.2d at 664. 
86 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (1985). 
87 Id. at _, 486 A.2d at 1225. 
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Foody explained, the cessation of medical treatment does not constitute suicide because 
"(I) in refusing treatment the patient may not have the specific intent to die and (2) 
even if he did, to the extent that death resulted from natural causes, the patient did not 
set the death producing agent in motion with intent to cause his own death. "88 The 
traditional definition of suicide is "self-destruction" or "the deliberate termination of 
one's own life."89 The actions in these cases clearly do not fall within this defmition. 
The fourth state interest concerns safeguarding the integrity of the medical 
profession. However, as the Conroy court noted, medical ethics have never required 
"medical intervention in disease at all costS."90 The terms "ordinary" and "extraordinary" 
care have previously been used in deciding whether to terminate "life-sustaining" 
treatment.91 Under this distinction, ordinary care is obligatory and extraordinary care 
is optional. The court in Foody defined these terms: 
Ordinary means are all medicines, treatments and operations which offer 
a reasonable hope of benefit and which can be obtained and used without 
excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience. Extraordinary means are 
all medicines, treatments and operations which cannot be obtained or used 
without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience, or if used, would 
not offer a reasonable hope of benefit. 92 
Therefore, the court concluded that the right to refuse treatment in appropriate 
circumstances is consistent with existing medical mores.93 In fact, surveys have recently 
noted that the majority of physicians approve of "passive euthanasia" and believe that 
88 Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at _, 482 A.2d at 720. 
89 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990). 
90 Conroy, 98 N.J. at _, 486 A.2d at 1224. 
91 Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, _, 482 A.2d 
713, 719 (1984). 
92 Id. at _, 482 A.2d at 719 (quoting KELLy, MEDIe<rMORAL PROBLEMS 129 
(1959». 
93 Id. at _, 482 A.2d at 720. 
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their colleagues are practicing it.94 As noted in several decisions, where there is no 
"bad faith," doctors will not be held criminally or civilly liable for carrying out the 
decision of a substitute decisionmaker.95 
One additional societal interest, the cost of medical care, actually supports 
withholding treatment. Today, some ten-thousand people remain in a persistent 
vegetative state. A million and a half more suffer from "severe dementia," and, by the 
year 2000, the number of those with the disease is expected to rise by sixty percent.96 
Also, a Harvard Medical School report found that there are close to four million more 
suffering from Alzheimer's disease.97 The money that it costs this country to care for 
the ten thousand patients in a vegetative state could be used for patients who have 
some hope of improving. 
The care for Nancy Cruzan alone costs a hundred and thirty thousand dollars a 
year. Her family doesn't pay; the State of Missouri and social security cover her 
bills.98 Her own medical insurance has been exhausted since 1986.99 The dissent in 
Cruzan noted that many people die because they cannot afford medical care, and the 
state has no desire to help them pay. 100 And yet, the State of Missouri appears 
94 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, _, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (1985). 
95 Id at _, 486 A.2d at 1242. See also John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. 
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, _, 355 
A.2d 647, 666-669 (1976). See generally Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 
3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). 
96 Hentoff, Does a Loving Family Have the Right to Kill?, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 
26, 1989, at 20, col. 2. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 20, col. 1. See also Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427, 429 (Mo. 1988) 
(en banc) (Blackmar, J., dissenting); id. at 432 (Higgins, J., dissenting). 
99 Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 432 (Higgins, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. at 429 (Blackmar, J., dissenting). 
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determined to keep Nancy Cruzan alive for as long as thirty years. 101 No wonder Joyce 
Cruzan, Nancy's mother, remains bewildered by the State's unbending position. Joyce 
Cruzan recently said: "She [Nancy] would not want that, and yet somebody out there 
says, 'It doesn't matter what she wants. It doesn't matter what you want as her family. 
The state says life is precious. Therefore, it doesn't matter what you want. It doesn't 
matter at all. Nancy doesn't matter. "'102 However, what Virginia must recognize is that 
valuable medical resources are dwindling and difficult choices about who should receive 
what care must be made. 
CONCLUSION 
The standards of substitute judgment set forth above should help to balance the 
competing interests of individual privacy rights, state interests, and health care costs. 
The decisions of other state courts provide the support necessary to fully implement the 
Virginia statute approving surrogate decisionmaking. These decisions also give credence 
to the fact that Virginia has provided a workable set of standards. Although the 
decisions about medical care for incompetents will continue to be difficult at best, the 
Virginia legislature has removed a substantial amount of the uncertainty about who 
should make treatment decisions in the case of formerly competent adults. 
In the end, the Quinlan court gave perhaps the best reason for implementing the 
doctrine of substitute judgment: "We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, 
that if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not altering the existing 
prognosis of the condition to which she would soon return) and perceptive of her 
irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of the life-
101 Id. at 411. 
102 Hentoff, supra note 96 at 20, col. 1. 
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support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural death."I03 
103 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at _, 355 A.2d at 663. 
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APPENDIX A 
VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Supp. 1990) provides: 
§ 37.1-134.4. Authorization for providing, withholding, or withdrawing 
treatment for certain persons; persons who may authorize exclusions; applicability 
restricted to nonprotesting patients. --- A. The procedures for surrogate treatment 
decision-making specified in this section shall be available as an alternative to 
other statutory and common law authority for making medical decisions on 
behalf of adult persons unable to make informed decisions, and health care 
providers may, but need not, invoke the procedures authorized herein. This 
section shall not affect the law defining the conditions under which consent must 
be obtained for medical treatment, or the nature of the consent required. 
B. Whenever a licensed physician determines after personal examination 
that an adult person, because of mental illness, mental retardation, or any other 
mental disorder, or a physical disorder which precludes communication or 
impairs judgment, is incapable of making an informed decision about providing, 
withholding or withdrawing a specific medical treatment or course of treatment, 
the physician may, upon compliance with the provisions of the section, provide 
to, withhold, or withdraw from the person that treatment upon the authorization 
of any of the following persons, in the specified order of priority, if the 
physician is not aware of any available person in a higher class: (i) a person 
designated in a writing executed pursuant to § 54.1-2984, if given such authority 
in the writing; (ii) a guardian or committee currently authorized to make such 
decisions; (iii) an attorney-in-fact appointed under a durable power of attorney, 
to the extent the power grants the authority to make such a decision, provided 
that the attorney-in-fact is not employed by the physician or the organization 
employing the physician; (iv) the spouse; (v) an adult son or daughter; (vi) a 
parent; (vii) an adult brother or sister; or (viii) any other relative of the person 
in the descending order of blood relationship. For the purposes of the section, 
the durable power of attorney may provide that it is effective during or only 
during a period in which the principal, because of a physical or mental 
disability, as determined by the provider of that treatment. For purposes of this 
section, "incapable of making an informed decision" means unable to understand 
the nature, extent or probable consequences of a proposed medical decision, or 
unable to make a rational evaluation of the risks and benefits of the proposed 
decision as compared with the risks and benefits of alternatives to that decision. 
For purposes of this section, persons who are deaf, dysphasic or have other 
communication disorders but who are otherwise mentally competent and able to 
communicate by means other than speech shall not be considered incapable of 
giving informed consent. 
C. The provisions of this section shall not apply to authorize 
non therapeutic sterilization, abortion, psychosurgery, or admission to a mental 
retardation facility or psychiatric hospital, as defined in § 37.1-1; however, the 
provisions of this section, if otherwise applicable, may be employed to authorize 
a specific treatment or course of treatment for a person who has been lawfully 
admitted to such a facility. 
D. The provisions of the section shall not authorize providing, continuing 
to provide, withholding or withdrawing of treatment if the provider of the 
treatment knows or upon reasonable inquiry ought to know that such an action 
is protested by the person. No person enumerated in subsection B of this 
section shall authorize, pursuant to this section, treatment, or a course of 
treatment, that such person knows, or upon reasonable inquiry ought to know, 
is contrary to the religious beliefs or basic values of the person unable to make 
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a decision, whether expressed orally or in writing. 
E. Prior to the initiation or cessation of treatment for which authorization 
has been obtained or will be sought pursuant to this section, and no less 
frequently than every 180 days while the treatment continues, the physician shall 
obtain a written certification that the person in incapable of making an informed 
decision regarding the treatment. This certification shall be made by a licensed 
physician or licensed clinical psychologist who is not otherwise currently 
involved in the treatment of the person assessed and shall be based on a 
personal examination of the person. The cost of the assessment shall be 
considered for all purposes a cost of the treatment provided. 
F. On petition of any person to the circuit court of the county or city 
in which resides or is located any person for whom treatment will be or is 
currently being provided, withheld or withdrawn under the purported authority 
of this section, the court may enjoin such action upon finding by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the action is not lawfully authorized by this 
section and that the action is not otherwise authorized by state or federal law. 
G. No person or facility providing, withholding or withdrawing treatment 
pursuant to the authorization obtained pursuant to this section shall incur liability 
arising out of a claim to the extent the claim is based on lack of consent or 
authorization for such action. 
H. No person authorizing treatment pursuant to this section shall be 
liable for the cost of treatment solely on the basis of that authorization. No 
person giving authorization pursuant to this section shall incur liability arising 
out of a claim of breach of duty to the person receiving treatment, provided that 
the person giving consent (i) prior to giving consent, makes a good faith effort 
to ascertain the risks and benefits of and alternatives to the treatment and the 
religious beliefs and basic values of the person receiving treatment, and to 
inform the person, to the extent possible, of the proposed treatment and the fact 
that someone else is authorized to make a decision regarding that treatment; and 
(ii) bases his decision on the best interest of the person, taking into account the 
person's religious beliefs and basic values and any preferences previously 
expressed by the person regarding such treatment. 
I. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the right to use, and 
the authority conferred by, any other applicable statutory or regulatory procedure 
relating to the authorization of providing, withholding or withdrawing treatment, 
or to diminish any common law authority of a physician to provide, withhold, 
or withdraw treatment to a person unable to make an informed decision about 
the providing, withholding or withdrawing of that treatment, with or without the 
consent of the person's relative. 
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APPENDIX B 
Virginia does not provide a form for executing a Durable Power of Attorney For 
Health Care. However, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2205 to -2209 (1989) provides a 
sample draft of a Health Care Power of Attorney. 
§ 21-2205. Durable power of attorney for health care. 
(a) A competent adult may designat~, in writing, an individual who 
shall be empowered to make health-care decisions on behalf of the 
competent adult, if the competent adult becomes incapable, by reason of 
mental disability, of making or communicating a choice regarding a 
particular health-care decision. 
(b) A durable power of attorney for health care shall include language 
which clearly communicates that the principal intends the attorney in fact 
to have the authority to make health-care decisions on behalf of the 
principal and shall include language identical or substantially similar to 
the following: 
(1) "This power of attorney shall not be affected by the subsequent 
incapacity of the principal. "; or 
(2) "This power of attorney becomes effective upon the incapacity 
of the principal." 
(c) A durable power of attorney for health care shall be dated and 
signed by the principal and 2 adult witnesses who affIrm that the 
principal was of sound mind and free from duress at the time of signing. 
The 2 adult witnesses shall not include the principal, the health-care 
provider of the principal or an employee of the health-care provider of 
the principal. 
(d) Of the 2 adult witnesses referred to in § 21-2204(c), at least 1 shall 
not be related to the principal by blood, marriage or adoption and shall 
not be entitled to any part of the estate of the principal by a current will 
or operation of law. 
(e) Any durable power of attorney executed ... and specifically written 
to include health-care decision making after incompetency shall be 
effective, if the execution of the prior document meets the requirements 
of this chapter. 
§ 21-2206. Rights and duties of attorney in fact 
(a) Subject to any express limitations in the durable power of attorney 
for health care, an attorney in fact shall have all the rights, powers and 
authority related to health-care decisions that the principal would have 
under District and federal law. This authority shall include, at a 
minimum: 
(1) The authority to grant, refuse or withdraw consent to the 
provision of any health-care service, treatment, or procedure; 
(2) The right to review the health care records of the principal; 
(3) The right to be provided with all information necessary to 
make informed health-care decisions; 
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(4) The authority to select and discharge health-care professionals; 
and 
(5) The authority to make decisions regarding admission to or 
discharge from health-care facilities and to take any lawful actions 
. that may be necessary to carry out these decisions. 
(b) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection and 
unless a durable· power of attorney for health care provides otherwise, the 
designated attorney in fact, if known to a health-care provider to be 
available and willing to make a particular health-care decision, shall have 
priority over any other person to act for the principal in all matters 
regarding health care. 
(2) A designated attorney in fact shall not have the authority to 
make a particular health-care decision, if the principal is able to 
give or withhold informed consent with respect to that decision. 
(c) In exercising authority under a durable power of attorney for health 
care, the attorney in fact shall have a duty to act in accordance with: 
(1) The wishes of the principal as expressed in the durable power 
of attorney for health care; or 
(2) The good faith belief of the attorney in fact as to the best 
interests of the principal, if the wishes of the principal are 
unknown and cannot be ascertained. 
(d) Nothing in this chapter shall affect any right that an attorney in fact 
may have, independent of the designation in a durable power of attorney 
for health care, to make or otherwise participate in health-care decisions 
on behalf of the principal. 
§ 21-2207. Forms for creating a durable power of attorney for health 
care. 
Any written form meeting the requirements of § 21-2205 may be used 
to create a durable power of attorney for health care. The following is 
offered as a sample form only and its inclusion in this section shall not 
be construed to preclude the use of alternative language: 
INFORMATION ABOUT lliIS DOCUMENT 
lHIS IS AN IMPORTANT LEGAL DOCUMENT. BEFORE 
SIGNING lHIS DOCUMENT, IT IS VITAL FOR YOU TO KNOW 
AND UNDERSTAND THESE FACTS: 
lHIS DOCUMENT GIVES THE PERSON YOU NAME AS YOUR 
ATTORNEY IN FACT THE POWER TO MAKE HEALlli-CARE 
DECISIONS FOR YOU IF YOU CANNOT MAKE THE DECISIONS 
FOR YOURSELF. 
AFIER YOU HAVE SIGNED lHIS DOCUMENT, YOU HAVE 
THE RIGHT TO MAKE HEALlli-CARE DECISIONS FOR YOURSELF 
IF YOU ARE MENTALLY COMPETENT TO DO SO. IN ADDmON, 
AFIER YOU HAVE SIGNED lHIS DOCUMENT, NO TREATMENT 
MA Y BE GIVEN TO YOU OR STOPPED OVER YOUR OBJECTION 
IF YOU ARE MENTALLY COMPETENT TO MAKE THAT 
DECISION. 
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YOU MAYST A TE IN THIS DOCUMENT ANY TYPE OF 
TREA TMENT THAT YOU DO NOT DESIRE AND ANY THAT YOU 
WANT TO MAKE SURE YOU RECEIVE. 
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO TAKE A WA Y THE AUTHORITY OF 
YOUR ATTORNEY IN FACT, UNLESS YOU HAVE BEEN 
ADJUDICATED INCOMPETENT, BY NOTIFYING YOUR ATTORNEY 
IN FACT OR HEALTH-CARE PROVIDER EITHER ORALLY OR IN 
WRITING. SHOULD YOU REVOKE THE AUTHORITY OF YOUR 
ATTORNEY IN FACT, IT IS ADVISABLE TO REVOKE IN WRITING 
AND TO PLACE COPIES OF THE REVOCA nON WHEREVER THIS 
DOCUMENT IS LOCATED. 
IF THERE IS ANYTHING IN THIS DOCUMENT THAT YOU DO 
NOT UNDERSTAND, YOU SHOULD ASK A SOCIAL WORKER, 
LAWYER, OR OTHER PERSON TO EXPLAIN IT TO YOU. 
* * * * * 
YOU SHOULD KEEP A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT AFIER YOU 
HAVE SIGNED IT. GIVE A COpy TO THE PERSON YOU NAME 
AS YOUR ATTORNEY IN FACT. IF YOU ARE IN A HEALTH-
CARE FACILITY, A COpy OF THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE 
INCLUDED IN YOUR MEDICAL RECORD. 
POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE 
I, _____________ " hereby appoint: 
name home address 
home telephone number 
work telephone number 
as my attorney in fact to make health-care decisions for me if I become 
unable to make my own health-care decisions. This gives my attorney 
in fact the power to grant, refuse, or withdraw consent on my behalf for 
any health-care service, treatment or procedure. My attorney in fact also 
has the authority to talk to healtb-carepersonnel, get information and sign 
forms necessary to carry out these decisions. 
If the person named as my attorney in fact is not available or is 
unable to act as my attorney in fact, I appoint the following person to 
serve in the order listed below: 
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1. 
name home address 
home telephone number 
work telephone number 
2. 
name home address 
home telephone number 
work telephone number 
With this document, I intend to create a power of attorney for health 
care, which shall take effect if I become incapable of making my own 
health-care decisions and shall continue during that incapacity. 
My attorney in fact shall make health-care decisions as I direct below 
or as I make known to my attorney in fact in some other way. 
(a) ST A lEMENT OF DIRECTIVES CONCERNING LIFE-
PROLONGING CARE, TREATMENT, SERVICES, AND 
PROCEDURES: 
(b) SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND LIMITATIONS: 
BY MY SIGNATURE I INDICATE THAT I UNDERSTAND TIIE 
PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THIS DOCUMENT. 
I sign my name to this form on ________ _ 
(date) 
at: 
__________________ (address). 
(Signature ) 
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WITNESSES 
I declare that the person who signed or acknowledged this document 
is personally known to me, that the person signed or acknowledged this 
durable power of attorney for health care in my presence, and that the 
person appears to be of sound mind and under no duress, fraud, or undue 
influence. I am not the person appointed as the attorney in fact by this 
document, nor am I the health-care provider of the principal or an 
employee of the health-care provider of the principal. 
First Witness 
Signature: 
Home Address: 
Print Name: 
Date: 
Second Witness 
Signature: 
Home Address: 
Print Name: 
Date: 
(AT LEAST 1 OF THE WITNESSES LISTED ABOVE SHALL ALSO 
SIGN THE FOLLOWING DECLARATION.) 
I further declare that I am not related to the principal by blood, 
marriage or adoption, and, to the best of my knowledge, I am not entitled 
to any part of the estate of the principal under a currently existing will 
or by operation of law. 
Signature: 
Signature: 
§ 21-2208. Revocation. 
(a) At any time that the principal has the capacity to create a durable 
power of attorney for health care, the principal may: 
(1) Revoke the appointment of the attorney in fact under a durable 
power of attorney for health care by notifying the attorney in fact 
orally or in writing; or 
(2) Revoke the authority to make health-care decisions granted to 
the attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney for health 
care by notifying the health-care provider orally or in writing. 
(b) If a health-care provider is notified of a revocation pursuant to 
subsection (a)(2) of this section, the health-care provider shall document 
this fact in the patient-care records of the principal and make a reasonable 
effort to notify the attorney in fact of the revocation. 
(c) There shall be a rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of 
proof, that a principal has the capacity to revoke a durable power of 
attorney for health care. 
(d) Unless it expressly provides otherwise, a valid durable power of 
attorney for health care revokes any prior durable power of attorney for 
health-care decisions only. 
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(e) Unless a durable power of attorney for health care expressly 
provides otherwise, and after its execution the marriage of the principal 
is dissolved or annulled, the dissolution or annulment shall automatically 
revoke a designation of the former spouse as an attorney in fact to make 
health-care decisions for the principal. If a designation is revoked solely 
on account of this subsection, it shall be revived by the remarriage of the 
principal to the former spouse but may be subsequently revoked by an 
act of the principal. 
§ 21-2209. Health-care provider limitation. 
(a) No health-care provider may require an individual to execute a 
durable power of attorney for health care as a condition for the provision 
of health-care services or admission to a health-care facility, as defined 
in Statute 32-1301. 
(b) After an individual has spent at least 48 hours in a health care 
facility, a health care provider may request the individual to execute a 
durable power of attorney for health care subject to the limitations set 
forth in this chapter. The health care provider may not be named as the 
attorney in fact. 
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APPENDIX C 
VIRGINIA LIVING WilL STATUTE 
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2984 (Supp. 1990). 
Suggested fonn of written declaration. A declaration executed pursuant to this 
article may, but need not, be in one of the following fonns, and may include other 
specific directions including, but not limited to, a designation of another person to make 
the treatment decision for the declarant should he be (i) diagnosed as suffering from a 
tenninal condition and (ii) comatose, incompetent or otherwise mentally or physically 
incapable of communication. Should any other specific directions be held to be invalid, 
such invalidity shall not affect the declaration. 
Declaration made this __ day of (month, year). I, 
____________ " willfully and voluntarily make known my desire and do 
hereby declare: 
CHOOSE ONLY ONE OF THE NEXT TWO PARAGRAPHS AND CROSS 
THROUGH THE OTHER 
If at any time I should have a tenninal condition and my attending 
physician has detennined that there can be no recovery from such condition, my death 
is imminent, and I am comatose, incompetent or otherwise mentally or physically 
incapable of communication, I designate to make a decision 
on my behalf as to whether life prolonging procedures shall be withheld or withdrawn. 
In the event that my designee decides that such procedures should be withheld or 
withdrawn, I wish to be pennitted to die naturally with only the administration of 
medication or the perfonnance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide 
me with comfort care or to alleviate pain. 
OR 
If at any time I should have a tenninal condition and my attending 
physician has detennined that there can be no recovery from such condition and my 
death is imminent, where the application of life-prolonging procedures would serve only 
to artificially prolong the dying process, I direct that such procedures be withheld or 
withdrawn, and that I be pennitted to die naturally with only the administration of 
medication or the perfonnance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide 
me with comfort care or to alleviate pain. 
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such 
life-prolonging procedures, it is my intention that this declaration shall be honored by 
my family and physician as the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical or 
surgical treatment and accept the consequences of such refusal. 
I understand the full import of this declaration and I am emotionally and 
mentally competent to make this declaration. 
(Signed) 
The declarant is known to me and I believe him or her to be of sound mind. 
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RACIALL Y DISCRIMINATORY TRUSTS AND THE 
CY PRES DOCTRINE IN VIRGINIA 
James W. Reynolds 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent Virginia Supreme Court decision, Hermitage Methodist Homes of 
Virginia v. Dominion Trust Company/ has again focused attention on the cy pres 
doctrine and its ability to reform charitable trusts that discriminate. Charitable trusts, 
like all trusts, are "administered according to the trustor's intent as expressed in the 
trust instrument or will."2 One danger that exists in charitable trusts, however, which 
does not exist in private trusts, is that charitable trusts have a potentially infinite life 
because they are exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities.3 Because society and laws 
can change over a period of years, a formally "non-discriminatory" charitable trust can 
lose its specific purpose or become obsolete.4 Cy pres, which literally means "as near," 
allows a court to revise a charitable trust, as long as the settlor has a general charitable 
1 Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virginia v. Dominion Trust Co., 239 Va. 46, 
387 S.E.2d 740 (1990), cert. denied sub nom. Prince Edward School Foundation v. 
Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virginia, _ U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 277 (1990). 
2 Comment, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Grip: Charitable Efficiency and the 
Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REv. 635, 635 (1988) [hereinafter Charitable 
Efficiency]. 
3 [d. at 635. 
4 See Campbell v. Board of Trustees of the James Barry-Robinson Home for 
Boys, 220 Va. 516, 260 S.E.2d 204 (1979) (testamentary trust creating a "Home and 
School of Arts and Trades for Orphan Boys" was altered to allow the school to 
become a private prepatory school and later a residential treatment center because, 
among other reasons, so few boys could meet the orphan, religious, and residency 
requirements). 
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intent, in order to "meet unforeseen emergencies or changed circumstances that threaten 
the trust's existence."s 
This article will examine how the cy pres doctrine is applied to Virginia trusts 
that contain racially-discriminatory provisions. First, it gives a brief account of the cy 
pres doctrine's history and then focuses on how cy pres generally works. The article 
then examines the application of cy pres to Virginia trusts containing racially-
discriminatory provisions.6 Finally, it concludes with the general formalities to be 
observed when using the cy pres doctrine. 
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CY PRES DOCTRINE 
The English common law provided for prerogative and judicial cy pres doctrines.7 
Under the judicial doctrine of cy pres, the courts attempt to fulfill the settlor's intentions 
"as nearly" as practicable.8 The judicial cy pres doctrine is generally accepted, though 
S In Re Estate of Wilson: Judicial Reformation of Discriminatory Charitable 
Trusts, 5 PACE L. REv. 433, 442 (1985) [hereinafter Judicial Reformation]; see also 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). 
Id. 
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable 
purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impractical or illegal to 
carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more 
general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust 
will not fail but the court will 
direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose which 
falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor. 
6 Courts are more reluctant to use the cy pres doctrine to reform gender and 
religious discrimination in charitable trusts. In these instances, the courts may refuse 
to find state action though the state has some involvement in the trust, or the courts 
will reform the trust by removing the state action instead of excising the 
discriminatory restriction. See generally Luria, Prying Loose the Dead Hand of the 
Past: How Courts Apply Cy Pres to Race, Gender, and Religiously Restricted Trusts, 
21 U.S.F. L. REv. 41, 54 (1986). 
7 SCOTT, ABRIDGEMENT OF TIlE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399.1 (1960). 
8 Id. 
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sometimes reluctantly, in the United States.9 Conflicting with the desire to fulfill 
the testator's wishes, the prerogative doctrine of cy pres enabled the king, in his role 
as parens patriae, to deliver, in certain cases, the "property for any charitable purpose" 
he desired. lo In exercising his prerogative, the king had no duty to consider the 
testator's wishes;l1 he would merely indicate to the Chancellor how he desired the 
property to be disposed.12 The king's prerogative powers under the cy pres doctrine 
could sometimes lead to grave abuses of the testator's intentions.13 Because of such 
abuses, the prerogative cy pres doctrine is not recognized in the United States.14 
Despite American courts' disapproval of the prerogative cy pres doctrine, as American 
philanthropy increased at the end of the 1800's, the courts were less reluctant to use 
the judicial cy pres doctrine, especially as some "charitable donors" left their gifts to 
select groups in society. IS 
9 Luria, supra note 6, at 45. 
10 SCO'IT, supra note 7, at 714. 
11 [d. at 715. 
12 [d. 
13 Da Costa v. De Pas, 1 Amb. 228 (1754) (Jewish testator left sum of money 
in trust for the establishment of an assembly "for reading the Jewish law and 
instructing people in the Jewish religion." The trust was held unlawful) (cited in 
SCO'IT, supra note 7, at 715). During this period in England, such a gift was illegal 
because it promoted a religion contrary to the established religion. The king, using 
his prerogative powers, directed the fund be used to support a preacher in the 
Foundling Hospital and to "instruct the children in that institution in the Christian 
religion." SCO'IT, supra, at 715. 
14 SCO'IT, supra note 7, at 715. 
IS Luria, supra note 6, at 45. 
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GENERAL APPLICA nON OF THE CY PRES DOCfRINE 
The cy pres doctrine cannot be used to change the settlor's bequest merely to 
suit the "desires or convenience of the trustee."16 Under the cy pres doctrine, courts can 
revise charitable trusts when social or legal changes threaten the trust with 
nullification. 17 Courts will delete the offending provisions of the threatened trust, 
however, only when they can find a general charitable intent within the trust, showing 
that the settlor's "primary purpose was to aid humanity as a whole."18 If the settlor 
depicts no general charitable intent and the trust's original purpose becomes illegal, 
impossible, or impracticable, then the trust will fail. 19 
In applying the cy pres doctrine, most courts use a "standard three-part 
analysis. "211 First, the trust must be a valid charitable trust,21 meaning that it has met 
the formalities for creating a charitable trust. Second, the court must find that the intent 
of the trustor is hindered to such an extent that cy pres modification is justified.21 
Finally, the court must find a manifestation of the settlor's general charitable intent 
16 Judicial Reformation, supra note 5, at 444. 
17 Luria, supra note 6, at 41. See also Smith v. Moore 225 F. Supp. 434 
(E.D. Va. 1963) (The court concluded that because there was no forfeiture provision 
for non-compliance with the directions of the trust then the settlor did not intend 
explicit directions), modified, 343 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1965). 
18 Luria, supra note 6, at 41. 
19 [d. 
211 See Charitable Efficiency, supra note 2, at 642. 
21 See id; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 comment a (1959). 
21 See Charitable Efficiency, supra note 2, at 642. 
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within the trust.23 The court in Smith v. MoorfiM interpreted Virginia's cy pres statute, 
enacted in 1946, as adopting this three-part analysis. 
Before invoking the cy pres doctrine, whether by statute or through the 
medium known as judicial power, it is necessary that there be (1) a valid 
charitable trust without a gift over, (2) an existing general charitable 
intent, and (3) the beneficiaries must be indefinite or uncertain, or (4) the 
purpose of the trust must be indefinite, impossible to perform, or so 
impracticable of performance as to characterize the fulfillment of the 
purpose as "impossible.'1'25 
Section § 55-31 of the Virginia Code26 is designed to enforce charitable trusts and to 
prevent their failure if specific performance is impossible.27 
"General charitable intent" is the element in this three-part analysis that creates 
the most cy pres litigation.28 In Virginia, charitable gifts are "viewed with peculiar 
favor by the courts, and every presumption consistent with the language contained in 
the instruments of gift will be employed in order to sustain them. "29 In determining 
23 [d.; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). 
2A 225 F. Supp. 434 (B.D. Va. 1963) (The sum of money provided in the trust 
was inadequate to fulfill the specific intention of the trust, the construction of a free 
hospital. The cy pres doctrine was used to fulfill the testators' intentions "as nearly 
as" possible by using the trust to build a wing onto an existing hospital and using 
this wing as a free clinic), modified, 343 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1965). 
25 [d. at 441 (emphasis added). 
26 VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-31 (1950): 
When any . . . person gives . . . any real or personal property in trust 
to or for any educational, charitable, or eleemosynary purpose, the 
indefiniteness . . . of the beneficiaries named . . . or the indefiniteness 
of the purpose of the trust itself, shall not defeat any such trust and, if 
the trust is in other respects valid under the laws of this State, it shall 
be administered to conform as near as may be to the purpose for 
which created or, if impossible of performance for this purpose, for 
some other educational, charitable, benevolent or eleemosynary 
purpose. 
27 Smith, 224 F. Supp. at 447. 
28 Charitable Efficiency, supra note 2, at 642. 
29 Thomas v. Bryant, 185 Va. 845, 852, 40 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1946), (citing 
Hinsdale v. Chicago City Missionary Society, 375 lll. 220, _, 30 N.E.2d 657, 663 
(1940). 
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whether the settlor has a general charitable intent, Virginia law has accepted many of 
the positions in Section 399 of the Second Restatement of Trusts.30 Smith31 embraces 
the Restatement's position that terms like "property shall be devoted 'forever' to a 
particular purpose, or ... shall be devoted to that purpose 'and no other purpose,' or 
that the property is given 'upon condition' that it be applied to that purpose, does not 
necessarily indicate the absence of a more general charitable intention of the settlor 
••• "32 Such terms can act merely as an emphasis that the settlor wants the property 
to be applied for no other purposes "as long as it is possible and practicable and legal 
to apply it to the specified purpose . . .. "33 These terms do not necessarily indicate 
that the trust should end if it becomes impossible, impracticable, or illegal to achieve 
the trust's particular purpose.34 
Smith35 also accepts the Restatement's position that it is easier to establish a 
general charitable intention when the trust is possible and legal at the outset and 
becomes impossible or illegal at a later date, than it is when the trust fails at the 
outset.36 With this former circumstance, the courts can fairly infer that the settlor must 
have expected circumstances to change over a period of time and that his particular 
purpose may not be achieved.37 The courts presume that a settlor would want his trust 
30 Smith, 225 F. Supp. at 441-42. 
31 Id. at 441. 
32 RFsrA'ffiMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 comment c (1959). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 225 F. Supp. at 442. 
36 RFsrA'rnMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 comment i (1959). 
37 Id. 
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to be modified, rather than fail and possibly be distributed among heirs he may not 
know.38 
Finally, Smith39 accepts the Restatement's position that the trust will be modified 
to achieve its purpose, as nearly as possible, when the amount provided for the 
charitable purpose is too small, rriaking it impossible for the trust to accomplish its 
goal.4O The court will do this only if there is first a general charitable intent in the 
trust. In Smith, the court, in determining whether the settlor had a general charitable 
intent, stated that "the background of the testator, his interest and spirit in community 
projects, his education and business acumen, may all be considered," unless forbidden 
by the explicit terms in the trust.41 
THE CY PRES DOCfRINE AND RACIALLY-DISCRIMINATORY TRUSTS 
State Action 
In order to apply the cy pres doctrine, a court must determine that the following 
conditions have been met: (1) the settlor has made a valid charitable trust, (2) the 
terms of the charitable trust are not "impossible to perform" or so impracticable as to 
make the trust impossible to perform or illegal, and (3) the settlor had a general 
charitable intent.42 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States; nor shall any State ... deny 
38 ·Id. 
39 225 F. Supp. at 442. 
40 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 comment j (1959). 
41 Smith, 225 F. Supp. at 442. 
42 Smith v. Moore, 225 F. Supp. 434, 441 (E.D. Va. 1963), modified, 343 F.2d 
594 (4th Cir. 1965). 
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to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "43 A private trust 
is illegal when it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because either "the institution administering the trust is itself a state agency,44 or 
because the trust is intertwined with the state. "4S 
In Shelley v. Kraemer,46 the Court held that section one of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not apply to private conduct even if the conduct is discriminatory or 
wrongfu1.47 Thus, restrictive agreements between private parties do not violate any 
rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.48 The Fourteenth Amendment 
applies solely to actions taken by a state.49 However, the Court in Shelley found that 
actions taken by a state court and its judicial officers, in their official capacities, are 
state actions within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.so Therefore, any acts 
performed by a state's legislative, judicial, or executive branches will be considered 
state actions governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. "It is doubtless true that a State 
may act through different agencies, either by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial 
authorities; and the prohibitions of the [Fourteenth] amendment extend to all actions of 
43 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
44 Luria, supra note 6, at 51. 
4S [d. at 52. 
46 334 U.S. 1, 8-23 (1948) (Private agreements, based on race, to exclude 
persons from use or occupancy of real estate for residential purposes do not violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is violated if state courts enforce these agreements). 
47 [d. at 13. 
48 [d. 
49 [d. at 8. 
so [d. at 14. 
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the State denying equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by one of these 
agencies or by another."Sl 
In Evans v. Newton,Sl a tract of land was bequeathed to the city of Macon, 
Georgia, as a park for white persons only. When the city desegregated the park, the 
all-white Board of Managers for the park brought suit against the city, asking for the 
removal of the city as trustee. The Georgia trial court accepted the city's resignation 
as trustee for the park and appointed three "private" trustees, who contended that they 
could enforce the racial restrictions of the trust On appeal, the United States Supreme 
Court decided, however, that services which are "municipal in nature," such as those 
rendered by a park, are subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.s3 
The key factor in this case was the fact that "municipal control and maintenance" had 
been provided for so long that merely replacing the city as trustee was insufficient to 
rid the park of its public character.54 In its decision, the court recognized that "conduct 
that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so 
impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional 
limitations placed upon state action. "ss 
Racially Discriminatory Trusts 
The cy pres doctrine allows courts to modify trusts that have become illegal, 
unless the settlor intended that the trust property be used solely towards that illegal 
purpose.S6 In Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virginia v. Dominion Trust Company,SI 
Sl Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880). 
Sl 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
S3 [d. at 301-02. 
54 [d. at 301. 
ss [d. at 299. 
S6 REsTAlEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). 
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the settlor had provided in his will that his estate would be held in trust and that the 
income from his estate would go to a private school, as long as the school admitted 
white students only.sa The trust contained successive "gift overs," so that if the first 
school admitted any non-white students, the trust's income would go to a second private 
school. If the second private school admitted any non-white students, the trust income 
would go to a third private school. 59 The final beneficiary of the trust was a nursing 
home, and no racial restriction was attached to that gift provision.60 
In Hermitage Homes, the court found without discussion that the racial restriction 
was unenforceable because state courts, under the Fourteenth Amendment, cannot 
enforce racial restrictions.61 The court, however, did not use the cy pres doctrine. to 
revise the trust, which would have allowed the first school designated to take the 
income, because-* due to the "gift over" provision, there was no uncertainty in deciding 
who benefitted, and the need to fmd a general charitable intent was thus eliminated.62 
Furthermore, because the offending language could not be excised from the trust 
without changing its essential nature and quality, the gift to the educational charities 
failed completely.63 The "gift over" to the nursing home, which did not contain a racial 
S7 239 Va. 46, 387 S.E.2d 740 (1990), cert denied sub nom., Prince Edward 
School Foundation v. Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virginia, _ U.S. _, 111 S. 
Ct. 277 (1990). 
sa [d. at 49-50, 387 S.E.2d at 741-42. 
59 [d. at 50, 387 S.E.2d at 742. 
60 [d. 
61 [d. at 54-55, 387 S.E.2d at 744. The court found that the purpose of the 
trust was to educate white children only and not children generally. 
62 [d. at 58, 387 S.E.2d at 747. 
63 [d. at 57, 387 S.E.2d at 746. 
170 
restriction, was valid and ensured that there was no indefiniteness as to the trust's 
purpose.64 
In United States v. Hughes Memorial Home,6S the cy pres doctrine was applied 
to revise a trust. The Hughes Memorial Home was a private non-sectarian home for 
children. The home was established by a trust which provided that the home was for 
white children in Virginia and North Carolina. The district court found that the home, 
due to its discrimination against black children, violated the Fair Housing Act.66 The 
court further held that the racial restriction was merely incidental to the main purpose 
of the trust, which was to provide shelter for orphaned children.67 Finding that Virginia 
state law favored the use of cy pres "to permit continuation of charitable trusts in the 
face of changed conditions . . . ," the court decided that the home was entitled to 
continue its operation, as long as it ignored the racial restrictions in the trust.68 
GENERAL FORMALITIES FOR USING THE CY PRES DOCTRINE 
There is a general procedure for employing the cy pres doctrine when it has 
been determined that a settlor has a general charitable intent but that some of the trust's 
provisions are illegal, impracticable, or impossible.69 First, the party seeking to amend 
the trust should ask the court to determine whether the settlor had a general charitable 
intent.70 The court may then "refer the matter to a master," who will devise a scheme 
64 [d. at 58, 387 S.E.2d at 747. 
6S 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975). 
66 [d. at 549. 
67 [d. at 552. 
68 [d. at 552-53. 
69 SCO'IT, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399 (1960). 
70 [d. at 714. 
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for applying the property, which the court can accept, reject, or modify.71 If the 
problem is relatively simple, the court may devise its own scheme or adopt one of the 
trustee's suggested schemes.72 A trustee should not try to apply the cy pres doctrine 
without first seeking the court's instructions.1'3 If, however, the trustee does employ his 
own scheme before asking the court for directions, the court may let it stand if the 
court approves of the scheme as implemented.74 Additionally, the state's attomey-
general is required to be a party to any determination on how cy pres will be applied; 
the court, however, will always determine the proper scheme to be employed.7s 
CONCLUSION 
Section 55-31 of the Virginia Code76 provides that when a charitable trust has 
an uncertain beneficiary or purpose, or is impossible, the cy pres doctrine can be 
employed to make the trust conform "as near as may be to the purpose for which it 
was created."77 Generally, when a charitable trust contains a racial restriction, the court 
will determine that the trust is invalid because enforcing such a restriction would violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. If, however, the court 
finds that the testator had a general charitable intent, which is not limited by the racial 
restriction, the court will revise the charitable trust by removing the racial restriction. 
This will ensure that the testator's general charitable intentions will be carried out. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
7S Id. 
76 VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-31 (1950). 
77 Id.; see supra note 26. 
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However, if the settlor does not have a general charitable intent and includes a racial 
restriction in a charitable trust, the trust will fail. 
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THE DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: 
VIRGINIA'S RESPONSE TO FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT REFORM 
Anne D. Bowling 
INTRODUCfION: THE NEED FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
IN CHILD SUPPORT LAW 
One criticism of the United States' traditional societal treatment of children's 
issues is that it focuses upon specific perceived problems of individual groups of 
children, rather than a "comprehensive family social policy which truly promotes the 
well-being of all children or attempts to guarantee that all children receive consistent 
nurture and adequate financial support. "1 Through the last half of the twentieth century, 
issues of support and welfare for all children have grown significantly in importance. 
As recognition of the need for child support grew, it did so exclusively at the 
state level, with the federal government adopting a policy of abstention from the entire 
realm of domestic relations. This precluded the federal court system from interfering 
with state courts' imposition of child support awards.2 
Although federal courts had not historically played a part in developing the field 
of family law, Congress began legislating in order to remedy inadequacies in the states' 
systems of governing family relations.3 Escalating costs in the federal Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFOC) program focused Congress' attention on child support 
1 Howe, Who Speaketh for the Child?, 23 N. ENG. L. REv. 421, 422 (1988). 
2 Note, Bankruptcy: Including a Child Support Arrearage in a Chapter 13 
Plan, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 477, 483 (1986) [hereinafter Chapter 13 Plan]. This 
abstention has constitutional foundations. Since the Tenth Amendment reserves for 
the states "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States," U.S. CONST. amend. X, and the powers to legislate in 
the areas of family and domestic matters are not specifically granted to Congress by 
Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution (enumerating Congress' powers), the jurisdiction to 
control domestic relations lies with the states. Chapter 13 Plan, supra, at 483 n.34. 
3 Krause, Reflections on Child Support, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 99, 99 (1983) 
[hereinafter Reflections]. 
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enforcement problems at the state level.4 By 1975, Congress had enacted laws which 
would effectively override state laws in the domestic relations field.s 
The federal government entered the area of child support both because of 
recognition of the subject's importance,6 and because of the states' failure to provide 
for the needs of children.7 A major problem with the states' systems was the 
inadequacy of the support orders issued by the state courts.8 As a result, custodial 
parents, usually mothers of the children needing support, were faced with a grossly 
disproportionate share of child-raising expenses, creating a "feminization and cradlization 
of poverty. "9 
Another problem with the state courts' exclusive jurisdiction over child support 
matters was the inconsistency with which child support orders were determined. State 
statutes governing child support provided little guidance to judges determining levels of 
support that were fair to all concerned parties. to The resulting support awards could 
4 Id. The AFDC program is a federally-funded means of support for families 
with dependent children. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
S Reflections, supra note 3, at 99 (citing Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-60 (1976». The laws of the United States are the 
"supreme Law of the Land," see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, and a federal law 
preempts state law if the state law's effect is to interfere with Congress' purpose in 
legislating in a particular area. Chapter 13 Plan, supra note 2, at 483 n.34. 
6 Historically, children are one of the groups with the most need for support, 
as well as the most deserving. Of those individuals living below standards of 
poverty, children are, clearly, the least r\.;sponsible for their situation. Giampetro, 
Mathematical Approaches to Calculating Child Support Payments: Stated Objectives, 
Practical Results, and Hidden Policies, 20 FAM. L.Q. 373, 373 n.l (1986). 
7 See Reflections, supra note 3, at 99. 
8 Woods, Child Support: A National Disgrace, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 538, 538 
(Oct. 1983); Brackney, Battling Inconsistency and Inadequacy: Child Support 
Guidelines in the States, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 197, 213 (1988). 
9 Brackney, supra note 8, at 199. 
10 Giampetro, supra note 6, at 377. 
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easily reflect judges' own policy preferences II more than the needs of the children 
involved and their parents' ability to provide for them. The inconsistency of this "case-
by-case method" had the potential to contribute to the tensions and hostility already 
present in a divorce situation.12 As a result, non-custodial parents, feeling that they had 
received unfair treatment by the court system, were less likely to comply with the 
order. 13 
Parental noncompliance was the third major difficulty with the state courts' child 
support systems.14 Census bureau reports from 1984 (when Congress increased the 
strength of states' powers to enforce child support)15 estimated the amount of overdue 
child support payments at forty billion dollars annually.16 In fact, almost a third of the 
ordered support was never received by the custodial parents. 17 One commentator has 
suggested that the federal government's AFDC system was viewed as an alternative to 
parents providing support. 18 The skyrocketing costs of this system, however, finally 
brought home to Congress the need for the government to take a more active role in 
the process of determining and enforcing non-custodial parents' duties to take financial 
responsibility for their children. 19 
II Id. 
12 Brackney, supra note 8, at 200. 
13 Id. 
14 Howe, supra note 1, at 423; Woods, supra note 8, at 538. 
15 See infra notes 50 to 53 and accompanying text. 
16 Note, Constitutional Implications of the C;hild Support Enforcement 
Amendments of 1984, 24 J. FAM. L. 301, 301 (1986) [hereinafter Implications] (citing 
The Courier-Journal, Sept. 15, 1984, at A16, col. 1). 
11 Woods, supra note 8, at 538. 
18 Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the 
Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1, 4 (Spring 1990) [hereinafter Private Responsibility]. 
19 Ref/ections, supra note 3, at 99. 
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Another commentator has drawn an illustrative parallel between the need for 
governmental coordination of child support enforcement programs and the centralization 
of workers' compensation laws.20 Before the current worker's compensation system, 
employees seeking recoupment for job-related injuries often faced obstacles similar to 
custodial parents seeking child support through the courts. Insufficient funds to hire 
legal assistance and prepare cases adequately, lengthy court delays restricting the 
availability of much-needed funds, and widely varying awards for similar cases were 
complaints common to both sets of plaintiffs. Also inherent to both situations were 
bogged-down court systems struggling to manage exploding caseloads?1 The solution 
for injured employees was a federal worker's compensation program. A similarly 
centralized federal program for child support would not only coordinate and establish 
state enforcement programs, but would also oversee their operation to ensure that the 
programs are implemented in accordance with the law.22 
FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE CHILD SUPPORT INITIATIVES 
The Social Security Act of 1935 
Federal statutory intervention in the child support area began as early as the 
Depression, though in a limited manner. The Social Security Act of 1935 included a 
section that established the provision of funds to impoverished mothers to help them 
care for their dependent children. This was the birth of AFDC. 23 The Act also required 
20 Henry & Swartz, Expedited Processes For Child Support Enforcement, 36 
Juv. & FAM. Cr. J. 77, 81 (Fall 1985). 
21 Id. 
22 Note, Child Support Enforcement: Balancing Increased Federal Involvement 
with Procedural Due Process, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 687, 688 (1985) [hereinafter 
Increased Federal Involvement]. 
23 Id. at 691-92; Baker & Stuff, The Costs and Benefits of Child Support 
Enforcement, 18 PROSEClTl"OR, J. NAT'L DIST. ATT'ys A. 27, 27 (Winter 1984). 
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non-custodial parents to contribute child support payments on behalf of their children, 
but provided no effective means to enforce this obligation.2A 
URESA: Interstate Enforcement of Support Orders 
In 1950, the National Conference of Commissioners on Unifonn State Laws gave 
state courts more power to enforce support orders from other states through the approval 
of the Unifonn Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).2.5 Every state has 
adopted a fonn of this model statute,26 and most states have since adopted the Revised 
Unifonn Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA).27 Under these laws, 
support enforcement begins with the custodial parent bringing a support enforcement 
action in state court.28 The court where the action is brought (the "initiating state") 
directs the petition to the jurisdiction where it is believed that the non-custodial parent 
is located.29 The court in this jurisdiction (the "responding state") attempts to enforce 
the order by obtaining jurisdiction over non-custodial parents and requiring them to 
remit their support obligations either to the responding court or to an appropriate state 
agency.3O These funds are sent to the initiating court which distributes the money to 
the party that brought the action.3' 
24 Baker & Stuff, supra note 23, at 27. 
2.5 Increased Federal Involvement, supra note 22, at 690. 
26 Id. 
27 Atkinson, The Child's Need Versus the Parent's Ability to Pay, 12 FAM. 
Aovoc. 26, 28 (Winter 1990). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
3l Id. 
178 
Though URESA removed the previous barrier to collecting court-ordered support 
from out-of-state non-custodial parents,32 the Act is criticized for the lengthy time 
periods required for enforcement by the two jurisdictions, the costs involved for the 
responding state, the low priority responding states give URESA cases, and the difficulty 
in locating non-custodial parents.33 
States' Enforcement Agencies 
In 1967, Congress amended the Social Security Act, and, for the first time, 
mandated the development and implementation of state-run child support enforcement 
programS.34 These amendments, however, did little to help custodial parents receive 
more of the support due them, because many states failed to comply with the revised 
law.3s The federal government was required to provide only fifty percent of the 
administrative costs of enacting the states' programs, and it did nothing to enforce the 
state programs' implementation.36 
Title N-D: Addressing a Growing Problem 
By 1974, seventy-eight percent of the children eligible for AFDC funding, 
approximately 6,062,000 children, were so situated because of the absence of a parent.37 
Only about a fourth of these children were provided for by court-ordered or voluntary 
arrangements to provide child support 38 Of this group, only about twenty-one percent 
32 Increased Federal Involvement, supra note 22, at 689-91. 
33 Id. at 691. 
34 Id. at 692. 
3S Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Baker & Stuff, supra note 23, at 27. 
38 Id. 
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actually received the full amount of the money owed them.39 As a result of this 
growing need, Congress, in 1975, added Title IV-D to the Social Security Act to 
address child support issues.4O The federal and state programs envisioned by the 
amendments were to provide four basic areas of service: locating absent parents 
responsible for providing child support, establishing paternity, establishing appropriate 
amounts of support, and enforcing support obligations.41 The Congressional intent in 
passing the amendments goes well beyond the objective of merely recouping disbursed 
AFDC funds from legally responsible parents: 
The committee believes that all children have the right to receive support 
from their fathers. The committee bill is designed to help children attain 
this right, including the right to have their fathers identified so that 
support can be obtained. The immediate result will be a lower welfare 
cost to the taxpayer but, more importantly, as an effective support 
collection system is established fathers will be deterred from deserting 
their families to welfare and the children will be spared the effects of 
family break-up.42 
The government also demonstrated an intent to enforce the new amendment by 
providing guidelines that state programs must meet in order to qualify for federal 
reimbursement of seventy-five percent of the state's administrative costS.43 Finally, the 
amendments created the federal Parent Locator Service, which provides state agencies 
with data from the Social Security Administration, Internal Revenue Service, and 
Department of Defense, which would otherwise be unavailable to the states' own locator 
services.44 The federal Parent Locator Service was designed to complement and enhance 
39 Id. 
40 42 U.S.c. §§ 651-62 (1988); see Increased Federal Involvement, supra note 
22, at 692-93. 
41 Haynes, Legislative Update: More N-D Follow-Up, 10 FAM. ADvoc. 11, 11 
(Spring 1988). 
42 Hearings on Senate Bills 1842 and 2081 before the Senate Committee on 
Finance, 93rd Cong., lst Sess. (1973), cited in Baker & Stuff, supra note 23, at 27. 
43 42 U.S.c. § 652(a) (1988). 
44 Id. 
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the resources of each state's parent locator service,45 and to fit in with the federal 
government's new role, under Title IV-D, as an overseer of the states' support 
enforcement programs.46 
IRS Cooperation in Enforcement 
In 1981, Congress brought the Internal Revenue Service into child support 
enforcement by allowing overdue support payments to be collected through the 
interception of non-custodial parents' federal income tax refunds.47 This streamlined the 
tax-intercept procedures previously provided for in the 1975 amendments.48 
The 1975 law instructed the IRS to provide "full collection" of delinquent 
debts.49 Under the 1975 act, the IRS could garnish the wages of AFDC or non-AFDC 
delinquent parents, attach and sell their property, or intercept their federal tax refund 
and forward it to the state requesting collection of the support obligation. so In order to 
receive this service, the debt needed to be delinquent in the amount of at least $750 
and established by an administrative or court order.51 Further, the state child support 
enforcement agency had to describe to the IRS the "collection actions" it had taken, 
4S Increased Federal Involvement, supra note 22, at 693 n.29. 
46 Id. at 694. 
47 42 U.S.C. § 644 (1988); see Roberts, In the Frying Pan and In the Fire: 
AFDC Custodial Parents and the N-D System, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1407, 1408 
(Apr. 1985) [hereinafter Custodial Parents]. 
48 See Increased Federal Involvement, supra note 22, at 697; Note, In Support 
of Support: The Federal Tax Refund Offset Program, 37 TAX LAW. 719, 723-24 
(1984) [hereinafter In Support]. 
49 In Support, supra note 48, at 723. 
so Id. 
51 Id. 
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why they were not effective, and why further state actions would not be successful in 
collecting the debt.51 
Under the 1981 Amendments, the Internal Revenue Service can become involved 
in the collection of AFDC arrearages of just $150, if the debt is at least three months 
old, and if the state child support enforcement agency demonstrates to the Department 
of Health and Human Services that the state has taken reasonable measures to collect 
the overdue support.53 The only collection method available under this "streamlined 
procedure" is to reduce the responsible parent's federal income tax refund by the 
amount of ordered support.54 
Expanding the System: The 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments 
In 1984, Congress further amended the Social Security Act to enhance the states' 
powers to enforce child support obligations and to make the services of state support 
enforcement agencies available to all custodial parents, regardless of their eligibility for 
AFDC benefits.55 A major effect of this set of amendments was its impact upon the 
substance of state laws; the 1984 amendments required that each state legislatively 
51 1d. at 724 n.34. 
53 1d. at 724. 
54 Id. 
55 The 1974 amendments only provided these services to custodial parents who 
were AFDC recipients. Implications, supra note 16, at 302 n.lO. 
The major objectives of the 1984 amendments are: to 
encourage states to aggressively seek child support 
collection for children not receiving welfare benefits; to 
mandate nationwide enforcement techniques that have 
already been proven successful; to provide fmancial 
rewards to states that improve enforcement programs; to 
audit all state programs; and to strengthen interstate 
enforcement techniques. 
Increased Federal Involvement, supra note 22, at 700. 
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provide for certain techniques of support collection. 56 Among these techniques are 
mandatory withholding of the income of the non-custodial parent, interception of federal 
and state income tax refunds, liens, bonds to guarantee support payments, a mandatory 
report of the non-custodial parent's support obligation sent to credit agencies, guidelines 
for child support awards, and expedited proceedings to handle child support cases.57 
The 1984 amendments clearly announce the intention of Congress to rule on the 
adequacy of state child support laws. 58 
Still Stronger Enforcement Powers 
In the 1988 Family Support Act,59 Congress made the states' new child support 
enforcement powers still stronger by providing stricter wage withholding of child 
support payments, rebuttable support guidelines for ascertaining support obligations, 
review of child support orders at least every three years, and federal standards for 
establishing paternity. 60 
The Current Federal N-D System 
With the successive changes in the welfare law (particularly with the 1984 Social 
Security Act amendments), applicants for AFDC programs must assign their rights to 
56 Dodson & Horowitz, What to Do About the Growing Problem of Child 
Support, 71 A.B.A. J. 133, 133 (Sept. 1985); Private Responsibility, supra note 18, 
at 8. 
57 Private Responsibility, supra note 18, at 8-9. Federal regulations define 
"expedited processes" as "any administrative or expedited judicial processes in which 
the presiding officer is not a judge of court, which increase the effectiveness of the 
establishment and enforcement process, and which meet specific processing time 
frames."; 45 C.F.R. § 303.101 (1990); Henry & Swartz, supra note 20, at 77. 
58 Private Responsibility, supra note 18, at 8. 
59 Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988). 
60 Private Responsibility, supra note 18, at 11; Roberts, Tenth Annual Review 
of Poverty Law: Child Support Enforcement in 1989, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1101, 
1104-05 (Jan. 1990) [hereinafter Tenth Annual Review]. 
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receive child support to the IV -D agency and agree to cooperate with the agency in 
locating the non-custodial parents, establishing paternity and support orders against 
them, and enforcing the orders.61 Through the custodial parents' assignments, the state 
acquires a financial interest, equal to the total AFDC payments, against the responsible 
parents. The state is in a better position than custodial parents to recover these funds, 
as it has the resources of the federal government and the reciprocal cooperation of the 
other states behind it.62 Implementation of a program this wide-spread is inevitably 
difficult and has resulted in various criticisms,63 but the federal government's attempt 
to unify and coordinate states' child support programs unquestionably provides a greater 
opportunity for fair resolutions of children's needs and parents' obligations.64 
THE DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT: VIRGINIA'S IV-D PROGRAM 
Virginia's response to the Congressional initiatives on child support enforcement 
was the creation of the Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE or Division), a 
subdivision of the Commonwealth's Department of Social Services.6S The functions of 
61 Private Responsibility, supra note 18, at 7. 
62 Id. at 7-8. 
63 Id. at 12 (still "wide variations" in different states' collection performance 
and enforcement of child support laws); Custodial Parents, supra note 47, at 1410 
(states benefitting from support collection causes indifference or hostility towards the 
IV-D agency); Tenth Annual Review, supra note 60, at 1109 (complaints about the 
timeliness and adequacy of service by the agency involved); Implications, supra note 
16, at 304, 307 (constitutional concerns regarding wage withholding and the tax 
refund intercept program). 
64 Baker & Stuff, supra note 23, at 29 (the benefits of a child support 
enforcement program are not to be measured solely by the funds collected to 
reimburse state and federal AFDC disbursements; the "indirect cost evidence" 
achieved by keeping other custodial parents "off AFDC" must also be taken into 
account). 
6S Acts 1974, Session 1974, enacted April 5, 1974, amending Virginia Code to 
add Sections 63.1-249 through 63.1-290. 
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the Division are governed by Title 63, Chapters 13 and 14 of the Virginia Code.66 
DCSE operates through sixteen offices located throughout the Commonwealth, and is 
staffed with program support personnel and Support Enforcement Specialists.67 
Although the Policy Manual for the Division is careful to point out that DCSE staff 
may not take any attorney-like role in the agency's cases,68 agency personnel perform 
many of the pre-trial tasks required in enforcement proceedings.69 Legal counsel for the 
Division is provided by a Special Counsel in the Attorney General's office, specifically 
assigned to child support enforcement matters, or representation may be obtained 
through cooperative agreements with Commonwealth Attorneys, city or county attorneys, 
or members of the private bar.70 
The services available from the DCSE are those mandated by Title IV-D: (1) 
Locating responsible parents and putative fathers in order to establish their child support 
obligation; (2) establishing putative fathers' paternity; (3) establishing and modifying 
orders for child support payments; (4) administratively and judicially enforcing spousal 
support if such support is ordered as part of the child support order; and (5) collecting 
and disbursing child support payments.71 In addition, the Division provides information 
about its functions and parental rights and responsibilities through brochures available 
at its offices. 
66 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-249 to -274.9 (Supp. 1990). 
67 Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Social Services, Division of Child 
Support Enforcement Policy Manual, ch. A, 1 (1990) [hereinafter Policy Manualj; 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Social Services, Pub. No. 032-01-935, 
Facts About Child Support Enforcement For Custodial Parents [hereinafter Support 
Enforcement Pamphlet]. 
68 Policy Manual, supra note 67, at ch. A, 1. 
69 [d. at 2. 
70 [d. at 3. 
11 [d. at ch. C, 1. 
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The Parent Locator Service 
The parent locator service offered by the Division is the State Parent Locator 
Service, which searches the Commonwealth for the absent parent, coordinates with other 
states' locator services to find responsible parents who have left Virginia, and uses the 
federal Parent Locator Service to search for responsible parents on a national level.72 
On the federal level, new regulations that are applicable to the states and designed to 
improve the quality of parent locator services became effective October I, 1990.73 
Establishing Paternity 
The Division of Child Support Enforcement uses both administrative means and 
the court system to establish paternity. Administratively, in a situation where the 
putative father is willing to admit paternity of the child for whom support is sought, the 
Support Enforcement Specialist informs the putative father that he has been identified 
as the child's parent and asks him to verify the claim.74 If the putative father does so, 
he is advised of his "rights and responsibilities regarding the issue of paternity."7s The 
putative father then reads a Declaration of Paternity Form and signs, under oath, a 
Paternity Rights and Responsibilities Statement.76 Both the custodial parent and the 
putative father sign the Declaration of Paternity form, and each receives a copy.n The 
72 Support Enforcement Pamphlet, supra note 67. 
73 Tenth Annual Review, supra note 60, at 1104-05. 
74 Policy Manual, supra note 67, ch. D, 1 (1990). The DCSE Policy Manual 
uses the term "putative fater" to refer to the party whose paternity the Division is 
attempting to establish. 
7S [d. at 2. 
76 [d. 
n [d. 
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Division files this document with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court 
(J&DR Court), where the judge signs it as a court order.78 
If the putative father denies paternity but agrees to have the probability of his 
paternity tested, he is informed of his duties and privileges as a parent, and is asked 
to sign a form acknowledging these obligations.79 In order to be voluntarily tested for 
paternity, the putative father must also sign the Voluntary Agreement for Genetic Blood 
Testing Form.80 If the genetic test results in a finding of probability of ninety-eight 
percent or better that the putative father is the child's father, he is declared the legal 
father as of the date that the positive test results are received by the Division, and must 
pay DCSE for the expenses of all of the parties' blood tests (the mother's, the child's, 
and his own).8! The father receives a copy of the Paternity Certification Form, which 
is filed with the court and becomes a binding court order.82 If the genetic testing 
results show a probability of less than ninety-eight percent that the putative father is 
indeed the father, DCSE may pursue the paternity issue in court. 83 If the court excludes 
the possibility of the putative father's paternity, the Division pays the costs of the blood 
tests.84 
Finally, paternity may be established only through the J&DR Court system if the 
putative father does not voluntarily agree to genetic testing.8s The child's mother 
completes a Mother's Affidavit of Paternity Form, and, in cases where public assistance 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
8! Id. at 3. 
82 Id. at 2-3. 
83 Id. at 3. 
84 Id. 
8S Id. at 3. 
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is not involved, fills out a Financial Statement.86 If the mother is receiving Aid to 
Dependent Children (ADC) benefits,81 she is presumed to have no income and does not 
complete a Financial Statement. Both documents are notarized.88 The agency or the 
mother ftles a paternity petition with the J&DR court, which orders blood testing of all 
the parties.89 The results of these tests are filed at DCSE.!IO 
Genetic testing is not the only form of evidence used in establishment of a 
paternal obligation. The court also considers whether the putative father and the mother 
were openly living together at the time that the child was probably conceived, the use 
of the putative father's name on the child's birth certificate, the child's use of the 
putative father's last name at any time since birth, and any government forms or 
'statements signed by the putative father that declare or claim the child as his own.91 
Federally, paternity testing is the area of domestic relations law that has changed 
the most significantly in the past decade, both because of a new, longer statute of 
limitations for paternity establishment92 and due to the technological development of 
more advanced means of testing for paternity.93 New federal regulations demand that 
the state must attempt to establish paternity within ninety calendar days of locating a 
86 Id. 
81 Aid to Dependent Children is a public assistance grant paid by .the 
Commonwealth to support dependent children. See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-87 (1987). 
88 Policy Manual, supra note 67, ch. D, 3 (1990). 
89 Id. 
!IO Id. 
91 Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Social Services, Pub. No. 032-01-
93211, Facts About Establishing Paternity in Virginia [hereinafter Paternity 
Pamphlet]. 
92 42 U.S.c. § 666(a)(5)(A)(i) (1988). 
93 Tenth Annual Review, supra note 60, at 1102. 
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putative father.~ A putative father's paternity must be established or excluded within 
one year of service of process or the child's becoming six month's old, whichever is 
later,9S to judicially establish paternity. 
Establishing the Support Obligation 
The 1984 Child Support Enforcement amendments to the Social Security Act 
mandated that states formulate guidelines to determine appropriate child support 
awards.96 Section 20-108.2 of the Virginia Code complies with the federal law.97 In 
Virginia, the methods used to set the amount of child support obligation differ 
depending upon whether or not the custodial parent is a recipient of public assistance 
(PA).!l8 In a "non-PA" case, where the custodial parent is not receiving public 
assistance, the Support Enforcement Specialist interviews both the custodial and non-
custodial parents, requires each of them to complete Financial Statements, and instructs 
them to report any future changes in their financial situations.99 Child support is 
established by taking into account each parent's income, monetary support paid to other 
children for whom the parent is responsible, and each parent's earning potential.100 If 
the responsible parent does not appear at the interview in which the Support 
~ 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(a)(1) (1990). 
9S 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(a)(2) (1990). 
96 42 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1988). 
97 VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-108.2 (1990). In accordance with the 1988 Child 
Support Enforcement Amendments, Virginia's support figures are rebuttably presumed 
to be a proper level of support. [d. 
!l8 Policy Manual, supra note 67, ch. E, 1-11 (1990). 
99 [d. at ch. D, 3-4. 
100 VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 20-107.1, -108.1, -108.2 (1990). 
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Enforcement Specialist gathers this information, the agency may establish a default 
judgment against him.lol 
If the custodial parent receives benefits from the ADC program, he or she is 
considered to have no income, and is neither interviewed nor required to fill out a 
financial statement.102 In any case involving a custodial parent receiving public 
assistance, it is likewise unnecessary to attempt to interview the non-custodial parent 
before establishing a default obligation. I03 The amount of the default debt is set at the 
level of ADC benefits paid to the custodial parent.104 
Once the appropriate level of support is determined, DCSE must establish the 
debt. lOS In a case where ADC payments have been paid to the custodial parent, the 
debt is established by sending an Administrative Support Order to the responsible 
parent, directing him to pay the stated amount. I06 The Administrative Support Order 
serves three purposes: it notifies the responsible parent that public assistance has been 
101 Policy Manual, supra note 67, at ch. E, 5. See infra note 105 and 
accompanying text. 
102 Policy Manual, supra note 67, at ch. E, 5. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. If a default obligation is established for a non-custodial parent in a 
non-PA case, the default obligation is set at the amount of ADC benefits that would 
be paid to the custodial parent, based upon the number of children supported and the 
area where the custodial parent and children reside. Policy Manual, supra note 67, 
ch. E, apps. B and C (1990). 
lOS Id. at 5. 
106 Id. at ch. E, 13. An Administrative Support Order is defined by the 
Division of Child Support Enforcement Policy Manual as 
a non-court ordered legally enforceable support obligation based on the 
income of the Responsible Parent and Custodial Parent as applied to 
the Support Scale, or a non-court ordered, legally enforceable 
obligation based on the amount of the public assistance grant paid or 
that could be paid for non-PA cases. The administrative order has the 
same force and effect as a court order. 
Id. at Glossary of Terms, 2. 
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or is being provided to persons to whom the responsible parent owes a legal duty of 
support, and that a child support debt is accordingly owed to the Commonwealth; it 
informs a responsible parent that, although the custodial parent may not be a recipient 
of public assistance, he or she has requested that child support enforcement assist 
him/her in collection of child support; and, finally, it advises the responsible parent that 
an Immediate Withholding of Earnings is about to be implemented against him or her.l07 
The Support Enforcement Specialist must schedule an appointment with the 
responsible parent within thirty days of service of the Administrative Support Order, to 
permit the responsible parent to provide financial information to the agency. From this 
information, the agency may set the parent's support obligation in accordance with his 
or her ability to pay.l08 If the responsible parent does not appear for this meeting, or 
fails to provide a financial statement, his or her obligation remains at the amount set 
forth on the Administrative Support Order.I09 
To establish the debt in a non-PA case where the responsible parent has had a 
default obligation entered against him or her, the agency serves an Administrative 
Support Order with the default amount included in it. l1O Once the ten-day period for 
appeal of the Administrative Support Order has passed, the agency files a non-support 
petition in the J&DR Court for enforcement. 11 I 
Collecting the Debt 
Child support in Virginia is paid in one of three ways. First, a court may order 
the non-custodial parent to pay support directly to the custodial parent; DCSE is not 
107 [d. at ch. E, 12-13. 
108 [d. at 7. 
109 [d. 
110 [d. 
III [d. 
191 
involved.1l2 Alternatively, if custodial parents do not receive public assistance, they 
may opt to receive their child support payments through DCSE. 113 Custodial parents 
receiving public assistance are legally required to use the Division's services. ll4 In any 
case where the Division provides collection service, the custodial parent must fIrst 
assign to DCSE any rights to receive funds from the responsible parent. Finally, if a 
non-custodial parent agrees to pay child support through voluntary assignment of his or 
her earnings, he or she signs an Assignment of Earnings form under oath, the form is 
sent to his or her employer, and the employer automatically forwards a portion of each 
of the responsible parent's paychecks to DCSE. llS These funds are credited against the 
non-custodial parent's support obligation.116 If the non-custodial parent refuses to 
voluntarily assign his or her wages to the agency, the Support Enforcement Specialist 
notifies the parents that, as soon as the obligation is legally established, an Immediate 
Withholding of Earnings Form will be issued to his or her employer. 117 The Immediate 
Withholding of Earnings Form operates in the same manner as a voluntary assignment: 
it is served upon the responsible parent's employer, who forwards a percentage of the 
responsible parent's pay each pay period to the Division.118 
112 Harman, A System Overload, 39 V A. LAW. 12, 15 (Sept. 1990) (referring to 
"direct pay" as an alternative to DCSE involvement in the enforcement of child 
support payments). 
113 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-250.2 (Supp. 1988); Support Enforcement Pamphlet, 
supra note 67. 
114 Support Enforcement Pamphlet, supra note 67. 
lIS Policy Manual, supra note 67, ch. E, 10 (1990). 
116 VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.3(A) (Supp. 1990). The employer's duty to 
comply with the withholding of earnings is set forth at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79.3 
(1990). 
117 VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 63.1-250.3, -258.1 (Supp. 1990). 
118 Policy Manual, supra note 67, at ch. E, 10. 
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Wage assignments may only be released by the Division of Child Support 
Enforcement. These assignments will only be discontinued upon satisfaction of the 
responsible parent's current obligation and aU arrearages owing for past support, or 
upon replacement by a Mandatory Withholding of Earnings or an Immediate 
Withholding of Earnings. 119 
Enforcement 
Enforcement of child support orders is the aspect of federally mandated state 
programs that has brought about the greatest degree of change in states' child support 
systems. 120 Pursuant to the Title IV-D, Virginia's Division of Child Support 
Enforcement employs a number of child support enforcement techniques, including 
immediate and mandatory withholding of earnings, liens and foreclosures, reports to 
credit agencies, orders to "withhold and deliver" assets of the obligor, unemployment 
compensation benefits, and state and federal tax refund interception programs. 121 
1. Immediatc? Withholding of Earnings. 
Once a support debt is established, each Administrative Support Order issued 
after July 1, 1988 is required to contain an Immediate Withholding of Earnings.l22 The 
administrative order is issued to the responsible parent's employer, directing its payroll 
department to deduct a specified amount from each of the responsible parent's 
119 [d. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text. 
120 Private Responsibility, supra note 18, at 8. 
121 See Policy Manual, supra note 67, ch. F, 1-48 (1990). While the following 
does not constitute an in-depth exploration of the various means available for the 
Commonwealth to enforce child support orders, it is intended to provide an overview 
of the more frequently-utilized methods. 
122 VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.3(A) (Supp. 1990). 
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paychecks. 123 The responsible parent may appeal the Immediate Withholding of 
Earnings, but must limit any objections to the issue of whether he/she actually owes a 
support obligation or to the accuracy of the information appearing on the Administrative 
Support Order.l24 In the event of an appeal, the agency may not implement any wage 
withholding until the Hearings Officer hearing the appeal makes a determination as to 
the validity of the Administrative Support Order.l25 
2. Mandatory Withholding Of Earnings. 
A Mandatory Withholding of Earnings (MWE) operates in a similar manner to 
the Immediate Withholding of Earnings. The Immediate Withholding of Earnings, an 
administrative enforcement technique, however, may not be used unless the responsible 
parent works in Virginia, holds attachable assets in the Commonwealth, or is otherwise 
subjected to Virginia law. l26 The MWE, though also an administrative remedy, may be 
used for both in-state and out-of-state cases. 127 Like an Immediate Withholding of 
Earnings, the Mandatory Withholding of Earnings is served upon the responsible 
parent's employer, and the order takes precedence over any other state law claims upon 
the employee's income, except for prior wage reduction orders to pay child support. l28 
A responsible parent's administrative appeal rights are, as with the Immediate 
Withholding of Earnings, limited in scope, and may address only a mistake of fact as 
to the identity of the responsible parent or error in the calculation of current child 
123 VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-250.3(C), (D) (1990). 
124 Policy Manual, supra note 67, at ch. F, 2a. 
125 [d. 
126 [d. at 2b. 
127 [d. 
128 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79 .3(A)(7) (1990). 
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support or arrearages owed.129 Unlike the Immediate Withholding of Earnings, the 
MWE remains in effect while the responsible parent's appeal is pending. If the 
responsible parent is found not to be liable for all or part of the support debt being 
withheld from his/her wages, the agency will return any money collected during the 
appeal process. 130 
3. Liens and Orders to Withhold and Deliver. 
For the Division to establish a lien against a responsible parent's real or personal 
property, that parent must either reside, be employed, or hold attachable property in the 
Commonwealth. \31 If the parent is a federal employee, a lien may be established if the 
responsible parent either resides or works outside of Virginia.132 If the responsible 
parent is employed outside the Commonwealth by an employer who has a registered 
agent in Virginia, the responsible parent's income is subject to attachment. \33 
Orders to Withhold and Deliver also operate to attach the responsible parent's 
property, but where a lien serves as an encumbrance of the responsible parent's real or 
personal property,t34 an Order to Withhold and Deliver is generally used to collect 
delinquent, not current support obligations, by collecting the responsible parent's 
financial holdings, such as stocks, bonds, bank accounts, and trust account income.135 
Orders to Withhold may be sent to all of the holders of the responsible parent's assets 
129 Policy Manual, supra note 67, at ch. F, 6a (1990). 
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until the amount of debt owed by the responsible parent is collected. l36 When the 
agency serves the holders of the responsible parent's assets with the order to withhold, 
it must similarly serve the responsible parent and afford him or her the right to an 
administrative appeal. 137 If the Division wins the appeal, it sends an Order to Deliver 
to the holders of the responsible parent's assetS. I38 
4. Tax refund collection. 
Interception of responsible parents' state and federal tax refunds operates as a 
form of withholding of the refunds for the satisfaction of arrearage debts. l39 Before any 
funds may be collected in this manner, the Internal Revenue Service Enforcement 
provides the responsible parent with advance notice that the support obligation had been 
forwarded to the agency for collection, and informs the parent of his/her right to 
administrative review of this decision. l40 The responsible parent is entitled to not only 
the administrative review, but also an administrative appeal and judicial review of the 
certification of his debt for collection.141 The responsible parent's tax refund is returned 
to him/her if DCSE had mistakenly certified the arrearage debt to the IRS, the 
responsible parent has fully paid his or her debt, or the total amount collected from his 
state and federal tax refunds exceeds the amount certified for collection.142 
As a last resort, any N-D agency may request, through the federal Office of 
Child Support Enforcement, full collection services by the Internal Revenue Service of 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 10-11. 
138 Id. at 10. 
139 Implications, supra note 16, at 310. 
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any delinquent sUpport.143 To qualify for this collection assistance, the agency must 
"have made reasonable efforts to collect child support without success,"I44 the obligation 
must be legally enforceable (either in the form of a court order or an Administrative 
Support Order), and the amount certified for collection must exceed $750.145 
Interaction with the Division of Child Support Enforcement 
One of the objectives of the Division of Child Support Enforcement is to 
"maximize the use of non-attorneys to the extent permitted by law"l46 in providing its 
services to citizens of the Commonwealth. However, there is still a need for attorney 
interaction with the Division. Responsible parents may be injured by the expedited 
procedures practiced by the Division, and their due process rights may be threatened by 
the child support enforcement's collections procedures.147 IV-D agencies may harm the 
custodial parents they were designed to assist,t48 particularly in jurisdictions where, as 
in Virginia, the IV -D agency is still working to establish itself. Attorneys involved 
with the system in those jurisdictions can help the establishment process by increasing 
143 Id. at 26. For a discussion of the IRS "full collection services," see supra 
notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 27. 
146 Id. at ch. A, 3. 
147 See Cipriani, Child Support Enforcement Curriculum: Defenses, 36 Juv. & 
FAM. Cr. J. 115 (Fall 1985) (defenses to child support orders and actions); Barber, 
Update on Title N-D, 1 AM. J. FAM. L. 383, 389 (1987) (questionable constitutional 
Validity of wage withholding regulations that do not provide opportunities for 
responsible parents to challenge "the jurisdictional validity of the underlying order"). 
, 
148 See Harman, supra note 112, at 12, 12-13 (despite "good intentions," 
Virginia's conversion from the court collection system to a IV-D system resulted in 
chaotic attempts to coordinate support funds for both AFDC and non-PA custodial 
parents). 
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their awareness of the agency's status and growth and advising clients of alternative 
means of support enforcement.149 
CONCLUSION 
Despite some of the difficulties of implementing a comprehensive program to 
effectively collect and enforce child support without infringing upon the constitutional 
rights of the non-custodial parent, efforts to ensure such a system are essential for the 
nurturing and protection of America's children. A unified national child support 
enforcement program affords children in all of the states an opportunity for fair and 
consistent child support, helps keep custodial parents from finding it necessary to tum 
to public assistance for support, and establishes a proportionate share of child rearing 
responsibility upon each parent. 
Virginia's Division of Child Support Enforcement reflects the Commonwealth's 
concern for and committment to this unified national system. By consolidating child 
support issues into a single agency, the Commonwealth relieves Virginia's court system 
of many enforcement and paternity issues, and ensures that the children of Virginia are 
at least as well cared for as children throughout the United States. 
149 [d. at 15. 
198 
